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	<title>Comments on: Turkey of a Pattern</title>
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	<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=562</link>
	<description>A place to discuss safety-of-flight issues, procedures, techniques, and judgment.</description>
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		<title>By: Robert Boyle</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=562&#038;cpage=2#comment-27945</link>
		<dc:creator>Robert Boyle</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Dec 2009 23:22:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=562#comment-27945</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The action taken to prevent a possible mid-air in my opinion was &quot;spot on&quot; and I&#039;d do the same thing. A mid-air collision in Ohio approximately 3 years ago took the lives of 3 good pilots that just did not see each other. 

One thing that I have observed over the past few years is when I have witnessed things like you spoke of and prevented,  it always seems to have the backwards tail attached in some way. I have seen a Mooney cut the runway at an intersection half way to take off ahead of one already on the numbers but not moving and I have been cut off on downwind ay mid field by Mooney who told me on the ground he was short on fuel (did not declare in the air though). Go figure !!]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The action taken to prevent a possible mid-air in my opinion was &#8220;spot on&#8221; and I&#8217;d do the same thing. A mid-air collision in Ohio approximately 3 years ago took the lives of 3 good pilots that just did not see each other. </p>
<p>One thing that I have observed over the past few years is when I have witnessed things like you spoke of and prevented,  it always seems to have the backwards tail attached in some way. I have seen a Mooney cut the runway at an intersection half way to take off ahead of one already on the numbers but not moving and I have been cut off on downwind ay mid field by Mooney who told me on the ground he was short on fuel (did not declare in the air though). Go figure !!</p>
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		<title>By: jason sparks</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=562&#038;cpage=2#comment-27928</link>
		<dc:creator>jason sparks</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 21 Dec 2009 17:44:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=562#comment-27928</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Keep offering the advisories! The effort is appreciated! If you had not made the
advisory and something went wong, you would later wonder if you could have helped to save someone&#039;s life. At least you can consider yourself proactive instead of one of those witnesses that just watch.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Keep offering the advisories! The effort is appreciated! If you had not made the<br />
advisory and something went wong, you would later wonder if you could have helped to save someone&#8217;s life. At least you can consider yourself proactive instead of one of those witnesses that just watch.</p>
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		<title>By: Mark Wood</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=562&#038;cpage=2#comment-27908</link>
		<dc:creator>Mark Wood</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 20 Dec 2009 06:37:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=562#comment-27908</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Interesting dialog. I have to agree that the call to point the traffic conflict was a good decision. The second call is probably not necessary. Kind of interesting all of time spent pointing out 91.126 that all turns be left turns unless otherwise indicated by appropriate marking. I would find it impossible to comply with that in normal operations as you have to make a right turn from the 45 in order to enter a left downwind so the FARs do have some flaws but there is always the intent and that points the normal turns in the traffic pattern ie downwind to base, base to final... This is for operations in Class G airspace. In class E where IFR operations are likely the rules aren&#039;t as clear cut. Here we run into what and how does a pilot conduct circling approaches especially from an off runway heading approach like a GPS A or VOR A. In this ATC or other procedures may dictate operations different than 91.126 which remains in effect. Reviewing the AIM most of the &quot;normal&quot; operations are recommended procedures and not mandatory and include the overhead initial approach procedures. No wonder it is easy to be confused on how to operate in an airport environment. 

So who was wrong in this situation? I have no idea but it seems there were a few errors. Seems the TIS wasn&#039;t working in the Cirrus or it would have been annoying the pilot with it&#039;s &quot;TRAFFIC&quot; &quot;TRAFFIC&quot; alerts. Maybe he was too busy wondering what that was about to sort out the Mooney ahead. Pet peave of mine as an instructor is to ask my student where the traffic is and have him point to the screen and say right there without ever looking up OMG...!! Okay how about the guy in the Mooney? Did he cut the Cirrus off? Was it intentional or was it because it&#039;s just plane old difficult to see out through that little bitty windshield? It seems he turned inside of the B52 pattern flying Cirrus. I&#039;ve spent lots of hours in the pattern with foreign students and their traffic patterns are different and larger than ours and trust me, following an Oxford B52 pattern Seneca around the pattern in a Champ can be taxing.

The only real thing with the flying that went wrong was the Cirrus pilots decision to use the 360 on final. This is specifically addressed in the AIM as a disruptive maneuver  but that is in terms of ATC. It was a bad call and it&#039;s hard to know why he decided to do it. It probably deserves some one on one refresher training or initial training on the subject. Going around may have been a better alternative or maybe S turns or who knows. Bottom line is it worked, however poorly and he probably learned from it.

It was probably a little over the edge to take on the roll of ATC and start giving further advisories once the initial alert had taken place. We truly can&#039;t know what was going on within the Cirrus cockpit after the shake up from the first event. We tend to get really worked up on the radio sometimes and as it was pointed out, CTAF is not the place to have these discussions. Stuff like this happens and opening a big dissertation on CTAF about it and arguing inhibits other participation from other aircraft. 

That&#039;s my $.02]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Interesting dialog. I have to agree that the call to point the traffic conflict was a good decision. The second call is probably not necessary. Kind of interesting all of time spent pointing out 91.126 that all turns be left turns unless otherwise indicated by appropriate marking. I would find it impossible to comply with that in normal operations as you have to make a right turn from the 45 in order to enter a left downwind so the FARs do have some flaws but there is always the intent and that points the normal turns in the traffic pattern ie downwind to base, base to final&#8230; This is for operations in Class G airspace. In class E where IFR operations are likely the rules aren&#8217;t as clear cut. Here we run into what and how does a pilot conduct circling approaches especially from an off runway heading approach like a GPS A or VOR A. In this ATC or other procedures may dictate operations different than 91.126 which remains in effect. Reviewing the AIM most of the &#8220;normal&#8221; operations are recommended procedures and not mandatory and include the overhead initial approach procedures. No wonder it is easy to be confused on how to operate in an airport environment. </p>
<p>So who was wrong in this situation? I have no idea but it seems there were a few errors. Seems the TIS wasn&#8217;t working in the Cirrus or it would have been annoying the pilot with it&#8217;s &#8220;TRAFFIC&#8221; &#8220;TRAFFIC&#8221; alerts. Maybe he was too busy wondering what that was about to sort out the Mooney ahead. Pet peave of mine as an instructor is to ask my student where the traffic is and have him point to the screen and say right there without ever looking up OMG&#8230;!! Okay how about the guy in the Mooney? Did he cut the Cirrus off? Was it intentional or was it because it&#8217;s just plane old difficult to see out through that little bitty windshield? It seems he turned inside of the B52 pattern flying Cirrus. I&#8217;ve spent lots of hours in the pattern with foreign students and their traffic patterns are different and larger than ours and trust me, following an Oxford B52 pattern Seneca around the pattern in a Champ can be taxing.</p>
<p>The only real thing with the flying that went wrong was the Cirrus pilots decision to use the 360 on final. This is specifically addressed in the AIM as a disruptive maneuver  but that is in terms of ATC. It was a bad call and it&#8217;s hard to know why he decided to do it. It probably deserves some one on one refresher training or initial training on the subject. Going around may have been a better alternative or maybe S turns or who knows. Bottom line is it worked, however poorly and he probably learned from it.</p>
<p>It was probably a little over the edge to take on the roll of ATC and start giving further advisories once the initial alert had taken place. We truly can&#8217;t know what was going on within the Cirrus cockpit after the shake up from the first event. We tend to get really worked up on the radio sometimes and as it was pointed out, CTAF is not the place to have these discussions. Stuff like this happens and opening a big dissertation on CTAF about it and arguing inhibits other participation from other aircraft. </p>
<p>That&#8217;s my $.02</p>
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		<title>By: Paul Miller</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=562&#038;cpage=2#comment-27906</link>
		<dc:creator>Paul Miller</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 20 Dec 2009 05:11:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=562#comment-27906</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[You are right to call him out;who wouldn&#039;t want to be alerted to prevent a disaster? Secondly,though..a 360 in the pattern? A go around and re-entering the pattern costs how much? He&#039;s lucky there wasn&#039;t a license-taking authority in the pattern. Or was there?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You are right to call him out;who wouldn&#8217;t want to be alerted to prevent a disaster? Secondly,though..a 360 in the pattern? A go around and re-entering the pattern costs how much? He&#8217;s lucky there wasn&#8217;t a license-taking authority in the pattern. Or was there?</p>
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		<title>By: Lance De Foa</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=562&#038;cpage=2#comment-27893</link>
		<dc:creator>Lance De Foa</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 19 Dec 2009 08:27:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=562#comment-27893</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[A few posted comments on how the pattern dimensions are not precisely defined in the regs.  

For my PPL, I was taught to turn base when at 45 degrees from the threshold, flying a downwind where the runway is half way up the strut.  In a C172 that means a steep full flap approach.  Then, while training for my night rating (5 hours night + 5 more hours instrument) I learned to turn base when I saw the VASIS/PAPI  turn from white to red.  After I completed my instrument rating, and saw how some descents from IAF to FAF are gentle and others are steep, I got intrigued by approach design, and learned this fact:

It turns out that for a standard 50&#039; threshold crossing height, with a standard 3 degree approach slope (as used on most ILS glideslopes &amp; most VASIS/PAPI glidpaths), circuit height intercepts the glideslope/path at about 4 NM from the threshold (right where you might just find an NDB!).

Maybe you were taught to descend 500&#039; on base so to turn base to final at 500&#039; AGL, which one would then expect to find on a 3 degree glidepath at about 2 NM from the threshold.   That same slope would require the downwind to be offset from the runway by 2 NM, which sounds like quite a bit to me.

A one mile downwind offset lets one descend on a 3 degree slope from 1000&#039; AGL to 750&#039; AGL for turning final at 3 SM from threshold.  Good for a stable &quot;power on,&quot; warm engine for the &quot;missed,&quot; approach.  Of course, those flying &quot;power off&quot; approaches will want to turn base closer to the threshold.

So then, for a 1 mile runway, one could expect a &quot;standard&quot; uncontrolled aiport circuit to be 7 miles long by 1 mile offset.  That should work for drivers of hot IFR aircraft made by Mooney, Cirrus &amp; Pilatus.  Those flying &quot;power off&quot; approaches will find them selves turning base &quot;inside&quot; the hot birds&#039; base legs  - and so begins the conflict!


As for the radio calls: First call to alert the of the conflict, no question it was the right thing.  Second call - ok again to alert of a potential conflict from converging right &amp; left base traffic.  If you had said &quot;you should have gone around rather than the left 360&quot; that would have been overstepping the bounds.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A few posted comments on how the pattern dimensions are not precisely defined in the regs.  </p>
<p>For my PPL, I was taught to turn base when at 45 degrees from the threshold, flying a downwind where the runway is half way up the strut.  In a C172 that means a steep full flap approach.  Then, while training for my night rating (5 hours night + 5 more hours instrument) I learned to turn base when I saw the VASIS/PAPI  turn from white to red.  After I completed my instrument rating, and saw how some descents from IAF to FAF are gentle and others are steep, I got intrigued by approach design, and learned this fact:</p>
<p>It turns out that for a standard 50&#8242; threshold crossing height, with a standard 3 degree approach slope (as used on most ILS glideslopes &amp; most VASIS/PAPI glidpaths), circuit height intercepts the glideslope/path at about 4 NM from the threshold (right where you might just find an NDB!).</p>
<p>Maybe you were taught to descend 500&#8242; on base so to turn base to final at 500&#8242; AGL, which one would then expect to find on a 3 degree glidepath at about 2 NM from the threshold.   That same slope would require the downwind to be offset from the runway by 2 NM, which sounds like quite a bit to me.</p>
<p>A one mile downwind offset lets one descend on a 3 degree slope from 1000&#8242; AGL to 750&#8242; AGL for turning final at 3 SM from threshold.  Good for a stable &#8220;power on,&#8221; warm engine for the &#8220;missed,&#8221; approach.  Of course, those flying &#8220;power off&#8221; approaches will want to turn base closer to the threshold.</p>
<p>So then, for a 1 mile runway, one could expect a &#8220;standard&#8221; uncontrolled aiport circuit to be 7 miles long by 1 mile offset.  That should work for drivers of hot IFR aircraft made by Mooney, Cirrus &amp; Pilatus.  Those flying &#8220;power off&#8221; approaches will find them selves turning base &#8220;inside&#8221; the hot birds&#8217; base legs  &#8211; and so begins the conflict!</p>
<p>As for the radio calls: First call to alert the of the conflict, no question it was the right thing.  Second call &#8211; ok again to alert of a potential conflict from converging right &amp; left base traffic.  If you had said &#8220;you should have gone around rather than the left 360&#8243; that would have been overstepping the bounds.</p>
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		<title>By: james</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=562&#038;cpage=2#comment-27891</link>
		<dc:creator>james</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 19 Dec 2009 07:06:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=562#comment-27891</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Aviate. Navigate. Communicate. Funny... I can&#039;t seem to find &#039;lecture&#039;. You communicated what you perceived to be a near midair. Hooray. You also keyed up to lecture someone who never signed up for your impromptu ground school. Boo. If you want to key up a radio transmitter to lecture people, get a ham license.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Aviate. Navigate. Communicate. Funny&#8230; I can&#8217;t seem to find &#8216;lecture&#8217;. You communicated what you perceived to be a near midair. Hooray. You also keyed up to lecture someone who never signed up for your impromptu ground school. Boo. If you want to key up a radio transmitter to lecture people, get a ham license.</p>
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		<title>By: Carl Wittfeld</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=562&#038;cpage=2#comment-27889</link>
		<dc:creator>Carl Wittfeld</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 19 Dec 2009 06:00:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=562#comment-27889</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[If someone told me there was a Mooney on my tail, and I was on final &amp; did not see him, I would most likely contact the person who told me and get out of the way.  At least go around and take a look; asking for traffic ID in the vicinity or even leaving the pattern in a direction I knew was relatively clear. I can always land somewhere else and a little later if fuel is not critical. A TWA captain told me many moons ago that anyone could have his airspace anytime they wanted it. I agree with that.  I would avoid any remote chance of a mid-air.  Anyone can
have a lapse of reason at any time, and can do something that is unsafe and unwise. To me, it should make all pilots more aware that an instant of unaware
can take us out. Fortunately, there are pilots out there who do take it upon themselves to speak up and warn others in the pattern. I welcome those instances where someone else is watching, can see what I can&#039;t and will warn me of a situation like that.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If someone told me there was a Mooney on my tail, and I was on final &amp; did not see him, I would most likely contact the person who told me and get out of the way.  At least go around and take a look; asking for traffic ID in the vicinity or even leaving the pattern in a direction I knew was relatively clear. I can always land somewhere else and a little later if fuel is not critical. A TWA captain told me many moons ago that anyone could have his airspace anytime they wanted it. I agree with that.  I would avoid any remote chance of a mid-air.  Anyone can<br />
have a lapse of reason at any time, and can do something that is unsafe and unwise. To me, it should make all pilots more aware that an instant of unaware<br />
can take us out. Fortunately, there are pilots out there who do take it upon themselves to speak up and warn others in the pattern. I welcome those instances where someone else is watching, can see what I can&#8217;t and will warn me of a situation like that.</p>
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		<title>By: Steve Kern</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=562&#038;cpage=2#comment-27887</link>
		<dc:creator>Steve Kern</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 19 Dec 2009 03:58:10 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=562#comment-27887</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[2.  I concur with your transmissions in the interest of safety.  The traffic pattern, it&#039;s procedures for entering and leaving, were all designed for predictability and standard operations.  While the Cirris did announce his intended left turn, it was not a manuever that would be considered standard for any  traffic pattern.  Just yesterday, I was doing pattern work at an non-towered airport and had to deal with a pilot who elected to enter the pattern on a base leg while I was on the downwind.  My head was moving like windshield wipers to get a visual and I widened out my pattern a little since I didn&#039;t see him until he turned final.  He should have entered the patttern on a 45 degree entry to the downwind.  I don&#039;t see any provision in the description of a traffic pattern in the AIM (par 4-3-3)  for a 360 degree turn in any direction anywhere in the pattern.  I would suggest that more than a few pilots could use a little refresher on correct pattern procedures.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>2.  I concur with your transmissions in the interest of safety.  The traffic pattern, it&#8217;s procedures for entering and leaving, were all designed for predictability and standard operations.  While the Cirris did announce his intended left turn, it was not a manuever that would be considered standard for any  traffic pattern.  Just yesterday, I was doing pattern work at an non-towered airport and had to deal with a pilot who elected to enter the pattern on a base leg while I was on the downwind.  My head was moving like windshield wipers to get a visual and I widened out my pattern a little since I didn&#8217;t see him until he turned final.  He should have entered the patttern on a 45 degree entry to the downwind.  I don&#8217;t see any provision in the description of a traffic pattern in the AIM (par 4-3-3)  for a 360 degree turn in any direction anywhere in the pattern.  I would suggest that more than a few pilots could use a little refresher on correct pattern procedures.</p>
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		<title>By: Ferdinand "Ferdi" Badescu</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=562&#038;cpage=2#comment-27884</link>
		<dc:creator>Ferdinand "Ferdi" Badescu</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Dec 2009 23:27:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=562#comment-27884</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[2.5 - Bruce, after reading ALL the previous comments and re-reading your story for the 10th. time, my conclusion is that I would have done exactly what you did. Warning the pilots in the traffic was the right thing to do in order to avoid a disaster. It may sound like &quot;coaching&quot;, but one&#039;s bruised ego is far better than the loss of life resulting from a midair colission. Last year, at Corona Airpt (AJO), in California there was a midair collision (NTSB #&#039;s LAX08FA049A and B) that killed not only the people in the two planes, but also a couple of people on the ground in a shopping center. If those people would have had the benefit of a warning, this tragedy wouldn&#039;t have happened.

You would think people have the wisdom to learn from others&#039; mistakes, but... Merely three months after the accident, at the same airport, I was in full takeoff roll after properly announcing myself on CTAF, when all of a sudden I see this low-wing plane coming at us head-on. Just like your Cirrus driver, (s)he was trying to land on the runway opposite to the one used that day, going against the traffic. (And, did I mention there was no announcement of his/her intentions on the CTAF?) I pulled instantaneously the throttle and braked as hard as I safely could preparing to exit the runway, while my friend (a CFII flying with me as safety pilot) went on the comm to let the other pilot know (s)he is going in the wrong direction. Fortunately, the other pilot -while not acknowledging itself on CTAF- pulled up before we would become another negative statistic. As an added benefit, were still on the ground. (Needless to say, my takeoff was aborted, and had to taxi back to active runway.)

Now, this is what I would call &quot;an honest to God mistake&quot;: When you acknowledge it (even though you don&#039;t respond) and take corrective action immediately. I concur with others who responded: the Cirrus driver was doing what was doing not because of ignorance, but because of sheer arrogance and lack of respect for others. For those who are sympathetic to the Cirrus driver&#039;s arrogance, I have one recommendation: try to walk a mile in the shoes of those who lost their loved ones in the midair collision at Corona!

Bruce, you did the right thing!]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>2.5 &#8211; Bruce, after reading ALL the previous comments and re-reading your story for the 10th. time, my conclusion is that I would have done exactly what you did. Warning the pilots in the traffic was the right thing to do in order to avoid a disaster. It may sound like &#8220;coaching&#8221;, but one&#8217;s bruised ego is far better than the loss of life resulting from a midair colission. Last year, at Corona Airpt (AJO), in California there was a midair collision (NTSB #&#8217;s LAX08FA049A and B) that killed not only the people in the two planes, but also a couple of people on the ground in a shopping center. If those people would have had the benefit of a warning, this tragedy wouldn&#8217;t have happened.</p>
<p>You would think people have the wisdom to learn from others&#8217; mistakes, but&#8230; Merely three months after the accident, at the same airport, I was in full takeoff roll after properly announcing myself on CTAF, when all of a sudden I see this low-wing plane coming at us head-on. Just like your Cirrus driver, (s)he was trying to land on the runway opposite to the one used that day, going against the traffic. (And, did I mention there was no announcement of his/her intentions on the CTAF?) I pulled instantaneously the throttle and braked as hard as I safely could preparing to exit the runway, while my friend (a CFII flying with me as safety pilot) went on the comm to let the other pilot know (s)he is going in the wrong direction. Fortunately, the other pilot -while not acknowledging itself on CTAF- pulled up before we would become another negative statistic. As an added benefit, were still on the ground. (Needless to say, my takeoff was aborted, and had to taxi back to active runway.)</p>
<p>Now, this is what I would call &#8220;an honest to God mistake&#8221;: When you acknowledge it (even though you don&#8217;t respond) and take corrective action immediately. I concur with others who responded: the Cirrus driver was doing what was doing not because of ignorance, but because of sheer arrogance and lack of respect for others. For those who are sympathetic to the Cirrus driver&#8217;s arrogance, I have one recommendation: try to walk a mile in the shoes of those who lost their loved ones in the midair collision at Corona!</p>
<p>Bruce, you did the right thing!</p>
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		<title>By: Paul Draper</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=562&#038;cpage=2#comment-27882</link>
		<dc:creator>Paul Draper</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 18 Dec 2009 22:53:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=562#comment-27882</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Hi Bruce,

I feel you did the right thing, air safety is everyones business, when you help in the air what could be more timely!

Merry Christmas &amp; Happy New Year, I&#039;ve enjoted everyone of your presentations, much continued success.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Hi Bruce,</p>
<p>I feel you did the right thing, air safety is everyones business, when you help in the air what could be more timely!</p>
<p>Merry Christmas &amp; Happy New Year, I&#8217;ve enjoted everyone of your presentations, much continued success.</p>
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