CFIs get risk analyis and decision making training as part of the FIRC (Flight Instructor Refresher Clinic) but my guess is that very little of this gets incorporated into daily activity or practiced regularly with GA pilots.

One last opinion: Scenario training is of tremendous value however it tends to be reactionary; That is, an instructor creates a situation that needs solving, the student then reacts. … Risk management should be an ongoing observation and thought process which begins with flight planning and continues until the plane is secured after the flight. When a risk is perceived, decision making begins.

By the way of decision making, the AOPA on-line course “Do the Right Thing-Decision Making for Pilots” is excellent. Thank you.

My preflight checklist consists of a mnemonic (7 P’s)of major flight risks.This simple mental checklist can be used for both VFR& IFR flights, and by GA pilots of different skillsets to help “Go-No Go” decision-making.Not rocket science,but complements ASF stuff and regular preflight planning.I consider the following “risk factors”:
1.PERSONS(ie pilot (proficient?)& passengers(source of distraction)
2.PLANE(ie any recent powerplant/ prop or fuselage issues)eg.broken pitot heat or recent annual
3.PANEL(capability,including pilot’s proficiency; recent squaks)eg.nonfunctioning autopilot is a “no-go” item for cross country IFR in a Bonanza vs a Cessna 310
4.PLAN(not just the flight plan,but stuff like day vs night flight,urgency of the trip,wt/balance,weather,fuel….understandably requiring a pilot to “step back” and take a look at the big picture)
5.PLACES(terrain&runway friendliness enroute and @destination,FBO services,IFR approaches,etc)eg.descent and approach over mountainous terrain @night in IMC increases risk
6.PRECIPITATION(ie IMC,weather and wind,icing forecasts)
7.POSSIBILITIES(this is required by FAR’s -as an alternate course of action;more than having an alternate destination airport)
I suspect the Cirrus pilot violated several of his own rules,had he stopped to consider them.In my opinion,everybody would benefit by using his own preflight mnemonic for rapid risk assessment.

Basic Pilot training teaches first and formost to build saftey margins in all flights with Fuel reserves, Physical Judgment, trip planning, take off and landing safety technics, Weight and Balance and of course Weather.

I continue to watch and read accounts of Pilots “pushing the envelope” whether it’s trying to impress observers of their Aircraft’s steep climb out and turn technics, how slow they can get it and still manuever or how they can do it all in one day…….There’s alot of VFR space and daylight out there and room to build in safety margins with every flight not to mention plenty of Hotels with comfortable beds to wait for such if the day gets away from you………

Great suggestion and already passed to the NTSB!

An area to emphasize with the NTSB investigators, should you have access to them and can influence their focus, would be the human factors analysis of this accident. You raise several very important and useful questions. I would add information about the pilot’s proficiency and currency with the circumstances of this flight — night, IMC, family passengers, transition training, CAPS parachute training, etc.

But will the NTSB factual report contain a “HUMAN FACTORS” section to answer them? Apparently, commercial airline investigations have such a section, but few if any GA investigations seem to include these details.

Cheers
Rick

Thanks much for your note. I omitted my usual disclaimer that all my comments are speculative at this early stage. When this was written we did not have the weather and latest Metar that we had showed VFR although the dew point was close.

The idea to get the NTSB move more quickly is enticing. Given the reality of gov’t budgets that may be a bit optimistic.

Brian, I can only imagine what’s going on in the Cirrus forums! Barring a mechanical malfunction the machines do pretty much what we tell them to. Since, this was an older model SR22, if I recall, the Flight Data Monitoring equipment may not be installed which gives us less to go on.

Hope to learnmore but I really interested in seeing how to communicate and navigate the risk – reward – skill issues.

Appreciates everyone’s thoughts.

A few details you have left out. Listening to ATCLive; the pilot got a popup IFR clearance so was on an IFR flight plan. Just shortly before the accident; the pilot had radio the FBO to request a taxi since he was not landing at his home airport as there were no IFR approaches.

Your point about flying when you have an important event is valid, but would like that you have suggested the use of Critical Decision Making rather than suggest that we should not fly. In this case; he was returning from the event. We don’t know what agenda he or the passengers had the next day. In this case, it might have been better to stay in KC and come back the next morning.

One thing that you could do to help the pilot community as they review these accidents is see if we can get the NTSB to release the preliminary and factual reports faster. In this case; I think it would have been better for you to wait till at least the prelimnary report was released so you have more of the details to base your questions/observatons on.

Thanks for your ongoing focus on safety and the complex questions surrounding it. I am a new pilot and read your magazine with great interest. This accident is a true tragedy, especially for those young passengers.

Through the complex questions and overlapping causes, the simple truth is that flying a plane carries risks, and it is our job as pilots to weigh those risks and make decisions based first on safety. This is no more or less critical in other walks of life, from driving a car to making management decisions in companies. Assuming there was not a catastrophic mechanical failure, would that Cirrus have crashed on any other day?

Some planes are more stable than others. Some pilots are more capable than others. I fly a Cessna 206, which is an incredibly forgiving airplane. The Cirrus is a more demanding plane but carries performance benefits accordingly. Pilots have many choices in the market, and the relationship between stability and performance is well understood. Design of a plane also influences the overall envelope. Choosing an aircraft, right up front, is part of the decision set a pilot is responsible for. I think Cirrus makes a wonderful plane, but I don’t feel qualified to step into one yet. It is interesting that some Cirrus owners blame the plane — a different plane could be (or for some, possibly should be) chosen!

The idea that accidents can be eliminated — or even substantially reduced — by “regulating” all aspects of a pilot’s choices is a losing path. Choosing to be a pilot acknowledges the risks. We must accept that responsibility for ourselves and for the passengers that depend on us. We’ll never fully eliminate accidents but each of us can individually choose a low-risk path every time we begin (or delay) a flight.