<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
		>
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: Spiral into the Gulf</title>
	<atom:link href="http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?feed=rss2&#038;p=2573" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=2573</link>
	<description>A place to discuss safety-of-flight issues, procedures, techniques, and judgment.</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Sat, 25 May 2013 13:42:07 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.5.1</generator>
	<item>
		<title>By: Keith</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=2573&#038;cpage=1#comment-44099</link>
		<dc:creator>Keith</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Apr 2012 00:02:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=2573#comment-44099</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The 421C I flew for 600 hours had a 28 gal aux tank in the left nacelle.  I would start the transfer pump 30-60 minutes after take off, and it took about 90 mins to make the transfer.  I would start a cross feed, left to right, at the beginning of the final 30 mins of transfer.  At the 90 minute point I would turn off the transfer pump, return the cross feed to mains and the fuel would be balanced.  If the Dr from Slidell had a carbon monoxide leak he might have already started the transfer before he passed out from CO poisoning.  Of course, he would not have done the cross feed portion of the balancing procedure and the plane would begin to spiral due to the fuel imbalance or the right hand end would exhaust it&#039;s fuel supply about 70-80 mins before the left side.  Few, if any, autopilots could keep the wings level with neutral trim and either scenario.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The 421C I flew for 600 hours had a 28 gal aux tank in the left nacelle.  I would start the transfer pump 30-60 minutes after take off, and it took about 90 mins to make the transfer.  I would start a cross feed, left to right, at the beginning of the final 30 mins of transfer.  At the 90 minute point I would turn off the transfer pump, return the cross feed to mains and the fuel would be balanced.  If the Dr from Slidell had a carbon monoxide leak he might have already started the transfer before he passed out from CO poisoning.  Of course, he would not have done the cross feed portion of the balancing procedure and the plane would begin to spiral due to the fuel imbalance or the right hand end would exhaust it&#8217;s fuel supply about 70-80 mins before the left side.  Few, if any, autopilots could keep the wings level with neutral trim and either scenario.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Rick</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=2573&#038;cpage=1#comment-44036</link>
		<dc:creator>Rick</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Apr 2012 17:43:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=2573#comment-44036</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I went through the Chamber back in the day and again a few times since. As they told me, my initial symptoms (unique to each individual and probably constant throughout your life) were an extreme feeling of heat. Knowing this, I feel prepared for any loss of pressurization. If you ever have the cahnce to take a Chamber ride, it is well worth while.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I went through the Chamber back in the day and again a few times since. As they told me, my initial symptoms (unique to each individual and probably constant throughout your life) were an extreme feeling of heat. Knowing this, I feel prepared for any loss of pressurization. If you ever have the cahnce to take a Chamber ride, it is well worth while.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: papadelta</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=2573&#038;cpage=1#comment-44035</link>
		<dc:creator>papadelta</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Apr 2012 16:59:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=2573#comment-44035</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Let&#039;s put Scott&#039;s theories to rest quick.  At flying speed it is very doubtful the pilot could open the door, period.  I think we would all like to believe that he ejected and is living happily in Brazil with his soul mate.  However, the truth is that he was probably dead within an hour of the lost comm.  Those of us who have done high-altitude chamber work in any of the armed services know that it sneaks up on you in a flash  and its over quick.  Remember trying to play patty cake with the person next to you?  We exploded in fits of giggles trying to hit each others&#039; hands.

To me this is a simple case of O2 depravation.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Let&#8217;s put Scott&#8217;s theories to rest quick.  At flying speed it is very doubtful the pilot could open the door, period.  I think we would all like to believe that he ejected and is living happily in Brazil with his soul mate.  However, the truth is that he was probably dead within an hour of the lost comm.  Those of us who have done high-altitude chamber work in any of the armed services know that it sneaks up on you in a flash  and its over quick.  Remember trying to play patty cake with the person next to you?  We exploded in fits of giggles trying to hit each others&#8217; hands.</p>
<p>To me this is a simple case of O2 depravation.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: jim hanson</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=2573&#038;cpage=1#comment-44034</link>
		<dc:creator>jim hanson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Apr 2012 16:47:47 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=2573#comment-44034</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I&#039;ve had 2 pressurization failures in over 14,000 hours of flying pressurized aircraft.  One was a door seal failure on a Cessna Citation at FL 370.  After an hour of cruise, the cabin started climbing gradually.  The cabin advisory horn came on, and the masks dropped.  We went on oxygen and declared an emergency.  The cabin never went above 16,000 feet--even with the power levers pulled back.  Leaving the power levers UP, the cabin maintained a 4.5 differential--under 8000&#039; at FL 200.  We finished the trip at that altitude.

The second was an explosive decompression at FL 270 in the climb in a Sabre 60--caused by a rupture of the main pressurization duct.  We went on oxygen, declared an emergency, selected emergency pressurization (no help) and descended to 10,000&#039;.

Some of the items that many instructors at training schools (and magazine writers) fail to mention are: 

The difficulty of donning a mask over headsets.  For that reason, I don&#039;t use headsets in pressurized aircraft any more--note that the airlines rarely do, either.

The NOISE associated with an explosive decompression--and on many aircraft, the noise from the emergency pressurization.  In the Sabreliner, it takes straight bleed air from the engine.

The difficulty in communicating with ATC OR your other crewmembers because of the noise.  In our case--we couldn&#039;t hear ATC--we transmitted our emergency in the blind.  It resulted in a loss of separation--we were 3 miles behind a LearJet in the descent.  We had to yell to communicate with the first officer.

The need to switch to the oxygen microphone.  For sanitary reasons, most simulators &quot;simulate&quot; putting the mask on in the simulator--and with 5 type ratings, not one actually had us switch over the mike.  

The quality of the microphone in the oxygen mask is often poor.  ATC had a hard time understanding our transmissions.

We filled out the NASA forms after landing--the FAA did follow up, but complimented us on our handling of the emergency--as did the NASA reporter.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I&#8217;ve had 2 pressurization failures in over 14,000 hours of flying pressurized aircraft.  One was a door seal failure on a Cessna Citation at FL 370.  After an hour of cruise, the cabin started climbing gradually.  The cabin advisory horn came on, and the masks dropped.  We went on oxygen and declared an emergency.  The cabin never went above 16,000 feet&#8211;even with the power levers pulled back.  Leaving the power levers UP, the cabin maintained a 4.5 differential&#8211;under 8000&#8242; at FL 200.  We finished the trip at that altitude.</p>
<p>The second was an explosive decompression at FL 270 in the climb in a Sabre 60&#8211;caused by a rupture of the main pressurization duct.  We went on oxygen, declared an emergency, selected emergency pressurization (no help) and descended to 10,000&#8242;.</p>
<p>Some of the items that many instructors at training schools (and magazine writers) fail to mention are: </p>
<p>The difficulty of donning a mask over headsets.  For that reason, I don&#8217;t use headsets in pressurized aircraft any more&#8211;note that the airlines rarely do, either.</p>
<p>The NOISE associated with an explosive decompression&#8211;and on many aircraft, the noise from the emergency pressurization.  In the Sabreliner, it takes straight bleed air from the engine.</p>
<p>The difficulty in communicating with ATC OR your other crewmembers because of the noise.  In our case&#8211;we couldn&#8217;t hear ATC&#8211;we transmitted our emergency in the blind.  It resulted in a loss of separation&#8211;we were 3 miles behind a LearJet in the descent.  We had to yell to communicate with the first officer.</p>
<p>The need to switch to the oxygen microphone.  For sanitary reasons, most simulators &#8220;simulate&#8221; putting the mask on in the simulator&#8211;and with 5 type ratings, not one actually had us switch over the mike.  </p>
<p>The quality of the microphone in the oxygen mask is often poor.  ATC had a hard time understanding our transmissions.</p>
<p>We filled out the NASA forms after landing&#8211;the FAA did follow up, but complimented us on our handling of the emergency&#8211;as did the NASA reporter.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Scott J. Smith</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=2573&#038;cpage=1#comment-44028</link>
		<dc:creator>Scott J. Smith</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Apr 2012 15:11:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=2573#comment-44028</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[A couple more theories.  The first, rather conspiratorial, but what the heck...we&#039;re all speculating...right?

Remember a few years ago, someone faking their own death by parachuting out of their own airplane (I believe this was in Alabama) ?  What were the financials of this doctor?  Was he being sued/divorced, etc.?  Could climbing out on a wing with a parachute (even if the door could be opened and slammed at that speed), disturb the autopilot sufficiently to cause a low-banked, consistent turn?  Were divers sent to confirm the existence of an occupant of the aircraft at 1,500 below sea level?

Back to reality:

Pilots that fly at that altitude are trained the first order of business during a pressurization failure is to don an oxygen mask, fly lower, troubleshoot the situation and communicate their situation / intentions.  Assume a failure in the oxygen system (partial blockage, broken valve, depleted supply, kinked or broken line, improper installation, etc.).  The pilot might not have been incapacitated at all:  Could he, under the effects of hypoxia (not complete incapacitation), have assumed that the fogged / iced windows were presenting an IMC condition, and assumed he was flying straight-and-level through a cloud layer?  Could he have partially regained his consciousness, confused about the low fuel situation, and performed adequate ditching procedures, only to be knocked unconsious permanently by the impact?

I realize these are more questions than answers...but they probably should be asked.  Along with, if it was perceived that the aircraft made a soft &quot;landing,&quot; why could the observer of that landing not reach the aircraft in time to perform a rescue / retrieval?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>A couple more theories.  The first, rather conspiratorial, but what the heck&#8230;we&#8217;re all speculating&#8230;right?</p>
<p>Remember a few years ago, someone faking their own death by parachuting out of their own airplane (I believe this was in Alabama) ?  What were the financials of this doctor?  Was he being sued/divorced, etc.?  Could climbing out on a wing with a parachute (even if the door could be opened and slammed at that speed), disturb the autopilot sufficiently to cause a low-banked, consistent turn?  Were divers sent to confirm the existence of an occupant of the aircraft at 1,500 below sea level?</p>
<p>Back to reality:</p>
<p>Pilots that fly at that altitude are trained the first order of business during a pressurization failure is to don an oxygen mask, fly lower, troubleshoot the situation and communicate their situation / intentions.  Assume a failure in the oxygen system (partial blockage, broken valve, depleted supply, kinked or broken line, improper installation, etc.).  The pilot might not have been incapacitated at all:  Could he, under the effects of hypoxia (not complete incapacitation), have assumed that the fogged / iced windows were presenting an IMC condition, and assumed he was flying straight-and-level through a cloud layer?  Could he have partially regained his consciousness, confused about the low fuel situation, and performed adequate ditching procedures, only to be knocked unconsious permanently by the impact?</p>
<p>I realize these are more questions than answers&#8230;but they probably should be asked.  Along with, if it was perceived that the aircraft made a soft &#8220;landing,&#8221; why could the observer of that landing not reach the aircraft in time to perform a rescue / retrieval?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Cary Alburn</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=2573&#038;cpage=1#comment-44025</link>
		<dc:creator>Cary Alburn</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Apr 2012 14:38:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=2573#comment-44025</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Last question first--absolutely not survivable.  The pilot had undoubtedly died literally hours before splashdown.

As a USAF ROTC cadet, I had a &quot;ride&quot; in the USAF&#039;s altitude chamber at Buckley AFB in 1965, and it was an eye-opener.  I&#039;d lived at high altitudes most of my life (Laramie-7300&#039; MSL) and thought I was immune to high altitude issues.  Not so--I was as much a victim as any of my compatriots, becoming essentially incapacitated within 3-4 minutes at 27,000&#039; (my recollection of exact altitude is foggy--it might have been lower).

Over the last few years, I&#039;ve learned to use my pulse-ox meter in the cabin, to determine when I need to go on oxygen--and that&#039;s in my hotrod 172 that tops out around 15,000&#039; density altitude.  I now routinely use the bottle over 10,000&#039; DA, sometimes lower.  Age probably makes some of the difference, because otherwise I&#039;m in good health.

There are many factors that go into how high one can fly w/o oxygen and still function well, and the FAA&#039;s requirements are too high for many to function well.

Regardless of the details, it&#039;s apparent that this particular pilot succumbed to lack of oxygen, a lesson for all of us that we really do need air, no matter how sophisticated or unsophisticated our airplanes may be.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Last question first&#8211;absolutely not survivable.  The pilot had undoubtedly died literally hours before splashdown.</p>
<p>As a USAF ROTC cadet, I had a &#8220;ride&#8221; in the USAF&#8217;s altitude chamber at Buckley AFB in 1965, and it was an eye-opener.  I&#8217;d lived at high altitudes most of my life (Laramie-7300&#8242; MSL) and thought I was immune to high altitude issues.  Not so&#8211;I was as much a victim as any of my compatriots, becoming essentially incapacitated within 3-4 minutes at 27,000&#8242; (my recollection of exact altitude is foggy&#8211;it might have been lower).</p>
<p>Over the last few years, I&#8217;ve learned to use my pulse-ox meter in the cabin, to determine when I need to go on oxygen&#8211;and that&#8217;s in my hotrod 172 that tops out around 15,000&#8242; density altitude.  I now routinely use the bottle over 10,000&#8242; DA, sometimes lower.  Age probably makes some of the difference, because otherwise I&#8217;m in good health.</p>
<p>There are many factors that go into how high one can fly w/o oxygen and still function well, and the FAA&#8217;s requirements are too high for many to function well.</p>
<p>Regardless of the details, it&#8217;s apparent that this particular pilot succumbed to lack of oxygen, a lesson for all of us that we really do need air, no matter how sophisticated or unsophisticated our airplanes may be.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Jeff Veers</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=2573&#038;cpage=1#comment-44022</link>
		<dc:creator>Jeff Veers</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Apr 2012 14:20:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=2573#comment-44022</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I was wondering why, with over 3 hours to plan a rescue, all that could be done was watch the aircraft splashdown and sink?  Is that much time at that altitude not survivable?]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I was wondering why, with over 3 hours to plan a rescue, all that could be done was watch the aircraft splashdown and sink?  Is that much time at that altitude not survivable?</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Elliot Zeltzer</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=2573&#038;cpage=1#comment-44021</link>
		<dc:creator>Elliot Zeltzer</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Apr 2012 13:09:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=2573#comment-44021</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I have flown C-421c&#039;s for more than ten years and can suggest the following scenario:

1- Pilot had possible low pulse-ox to start with
2- Cabin was not at proper pressurization setting or failure of system (very very rare)
3- Pilot did not or could no follow POH emergency procedure for loss of cabin pressurization
4- And here is the critical possibility:  The aircraft had a Cessna ARC IFCS or autopilot
5- Pilot when incapacitated hit or moved the turn knob on the ARC autopilot control just enough to be out of the detent and start slow (13 minute~ per turn) turns

The bigger question is his flight planned altitude.  While the C421c has a very high service ceiling it is not common at all to use these FL&#039;s unless you have a very good reason.  This was a short trip 600 mile or less and the time, fuel and stresses on the aircraft do not justify these altitudes.

my $.02]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I have flown C-421c&#8217;s for more than ten years and can suggest the following scenario:</p>
<p>1- Pilot had possible low pulse-ox to start with<br />
2- Cabin was not at proper pressurization setting or failure of system (very very rare)<br />
3- Pilot did not or could no follow POH emergency procedure for loss of cabin pressurization<br />
4- And here is the critical possibility:  The aircraft had a Cessna ARC IFCS or autopilot<br />
5- Pilot when incapacitated hit or moved the turn knob on the ARC autopilot control just enough to be out of the detent and start slow (13 minute~ per turn) turns</p>
<p>The bigger question is his flight planned altitude.  While the C421c has a very high service ceiling it is not common at all to use these FL&#8217;s unless you have a very good reason.  This was a short trip 600 mile or less and the time, fuel and stresses on the aircraft do not justify these altitudes.</p>
<p>my $.02</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Richard Sackett</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=2573&#038;cpage=1#comment-44020</link>
		<dc:creator>Richard Sackett</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Apr 2012 12:10:09 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=2573#comment-44020</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[This is a reminder to ALWAYS DO THE PRE FLIGHT CHECKLIST. As owner of many high flying Cessna&#039;s over the years, I know the Cessna Presurrization systems are essentialy indentical from model to model to the 421. Preflight, preflight, preflight and do not succumb to the temptation to fly with a less than FULL O2 bottle.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>This is a reminder to ALWAYS DO THE PRE FLIGHT CHECKLIST. As owner of many high flying Cessna&#8217;s over the years, I know the Cessna Presurrization systems are essentialy indentical from model to model to the 421. Preflight, preflight, preflight and do not succumb to the temptation to fly with a less than FULL O2 bottle.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
	<item>
		<title>By: Joe Horton</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=2573&#038;cpage=1#comment-44019</link>
		<dc:creator>Joe Horton</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Apr 2012 12:08:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=2573#comment-44019</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The moving spiral is what you&#039;d expect for an autopilot circle affected by a prevailing, but slightly inconstant wind from about 270.  The hiccup near the middle could have been caused by a one-time gust, stretching out that part of the turn.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The moving spiral is what you&#8217;d expect for an autopilot circle affected by a prevailing, but slightly inconstant wind from about 270.  The hiccup near the middle could have been caused by a one-time gust, stretching out that part of the turn.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>
