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	<title>Comments on: It&#8217;s not the regulation, it&#8217;s the execution</title>
	<atom:link href="http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?feed=rss2&#038;p=192" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=192</link>
	<description>A place to discuss safety-of-flight issues, procedures, techniques, and judgment.</description>
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		<title>By: online diet</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=192&#038;cpage=1#comment-24994</link>
		<dc:creator>online diet</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 04 Sep 2009 02:23:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=192#comment-24994</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&lt;strong&gt;online diet...&lt;/strong&gt;

Your topic Experiment: The Zero-Distraction Diet was interesting when I found it on Thursday searching for online diet...]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>online diet&#8230;</strong></p>
<p>Your topic Experiment: The Zero-Distraction Diet was interesting when I found it on Thursday searching for online diet&#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: Kevin Collins</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=192&#038;cpage=1#comment-22090</link>
		<dc:creator>Kevin Collins</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2009 16:04:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=192#comment-22090</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Mr. Christensen, thanks for the response!]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Mr. Christensen, thanks for the response!</p>
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		<title>By: Travis Christensen</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=192&#038;cpage=1#comment-22070</link>
		<dc:creator>Travis Christensen</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Jun 2009 07:13:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=192#comment-22070</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[To clarify for Mr.Collins, we were going through a series of stall maneuvers at 10000 feet when we simulated the accident scenario, so the altitude was not accurate in that respect.  The sim. instructor wanted to be able to demostrate the recoverability.  Apologies.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>To clarify for Mr.Collins, we were going through a series of stall maneuvers at 10000 feet when we simulated the accident scenario, so the altitude was not accurate in that respect.  The sim. instructor wanted to be able to demostrate the recoverability.  Apologies.</p>
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		<title>By: Roger Hanson</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=192&#038;cpage=1#comment-22033</link>
		<dc:creator>Roger Hanson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2009 14:23:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=192#comment-22033</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Mr. Turri, rather than dissect this crash further (as others in here have done a splendid job on) I&#039;m sure we can agree there is no denying the base elements have to do with pilot decision making. As a DPE, you know that a pilot&#039;s psychological &quot;programming&quot; is a critical component of good decision-making habits.To state that the training, fatigue, pay scales have no relevance to he &quot;root cause&quot; is a bit narrow in focus.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Mr. Turri, rather than dissect this crash further (as others in here have done a splendid job on) I&#8217;m sure we can agree there is no denying the base elements have to do with pilot decision making. As a DPE, you know that a pilot&#8217;s psychological &#8220;programming&#8221; is a critical component of good decision-making habits.To state that the training, fatigue, pay scales have no relevance to he &#8220;root cause&#8221; is a bit narrow in focus.</p>
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		<title>By: Robert</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=192&#038;cpage=1#comment-22026</link>
		<dc:creator>Robert</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2009 06:57:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=192#comment-22026</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The real cause of the accident was insufficeint clearance between plane and terrain.  Stalling the plane may have been causal to this accident.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The real cause of the accident was insufficeint clearance between plane and terrain.  Stalling the plane may have been causal to this accident.</p>
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		<title>By: Robert</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=192&#038;cpage=1#comment-22025</link>
		<dc:creator>Robert</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 12 Jun 2009 04:30:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=192#comment-22025</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I have NO agenda too.   I&#039;m an elevator mechanic who makes as much as a 747 captain.   If you guys like low wages that&#039;s up to you.   I just think you get what you pay for.   Forbes just had an article that listed the top ten blue collar paying jobs and elevator mechanics was number one.   By the way elevators are the SAFEST  mode of transportation.   What do I know I&#039;m just a private pilot.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I have NO agenda too.   I&#8217;m an elevator mechanic who makes as much as a 747 captain.   If you guys like low wages that&#8217;s up to you.   I just think you get what you pay for.   Forbes just had an article that listed the top ten blue collar paying jobs and elevator mechanics was number one.   By the way elevators are the SAFEST  mode of transportation.   What do I know I&#8217;m just a private pilot.</p>
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		<title>By: Mike Finkle</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=192&#038;cpage=1#comment-22022</link>
		<dc:creator>Mike Finkle</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2009 21:28:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=192#comment-22022</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Dave Tuuri Wrote (in response to one of my posts): 

&quot;I think you are using this accident to further your own agenda–and you have lots of company, unfortunately.&quot;  You (Dave) wrote this in response to my statement that &quot;we don’t know that his performance was satisfactory regarding stall recoveries&quot;.  You disagreed, you said, because &quot;As a former DPE myself, I noted no reference to stalls anywhere in any test the PIC ever failed &quot;.

As I pointed out, and as a knowledgeable former DPE I would think you&#039;d agree, check pilots are not required to list every single area of performance in which the pilot was initially less than proficient.  All they must really record, in practice, is sufficient information to justify a finding of a disapproval.  Further, as long as in the opinion of the check pilot the airman eventually received training in and/or satisfactorily demonstrated proficiency in noted deficient areas, that tested airman may then subsequently &quot;pass&quot;.  Especially since he had test events in which it was determined that the entire flight check must be redone, we don&#039;t know all of the specifics.  I was, therefore, merely stating that we don&#039;t absolutely KNOW (as I feel you stated when you said &quot;About the only thing he NEVER FAILED - your caps - was stall recovery) that this particular pilot had not had any problems with stalls.  We can only KNOW if an area was found to be unsatisfactory if it has been specifically identified as such, not if it has NOT been documented.   

I never said, nor meant, that he had previouslly performed poorly at stall recoveries, nor did I even provide a reason as to why he seems to have done so in this accident.  In fact, I asked/stated &quot;Was he simply “surprised” and/or “panicked”, responding in a manner contrary to everything he had been taught? We’ll probably never know for sure, but it certainly seems so.&quot;

While I can understand how you might (possibly correctly) view some of the comments in some of the posts here as &quot;just crusaders’ efforts at ‘not wasting a crisis’&quot; to further their own personal agenda, what in the world to you think might have been my ulterior motives or &quot;agenda&quot;?  

I believe I have done nothing more than to restate factual information, along with some personal experience and belief, in a logical, rational, and deductive manner to support my view of what I think the NTSB may ultimately find were the probable causes of this accident.  I don&#039;t believe I promoted anything but thought, and I attacked nothing and no one.  I assure you I have and had no agenda at all, either open or hidden, other than to attempt to bring information to light for consideration by any interested people who read Bruce&#039;s article and our posts here.  I do this in the hope that we might all be encouraged to remind ourselves, and others, that we must always be vigilant in our duties, and proficient in our performance, when we fly.  The consequences of not doing so are simply too great, and all of us lose at least a little when any of us fail to remember that.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Dave Tuuri Wrote (in response to one of my posts): </p>
<p>&#8220;I think you are using this accident to further your own agenda–and you have lots of company, unfortunately.&#8221;  You (Dave) wrote this in response to my statement that &#8220;we don’t know that his performance was satisfactory regarding stall recoveries&#8221;.  You disagreed, you said, because &#8220;As a former DPE myself, I noted no reference to stalls anywhere in any test the PIC ever failed &#8220;.</p>
<p>As I pointed out, and as a knowledgeable former DPE I would think you&#8217;d agree, check pilots are not required to list every single area of performance in which the pilot was initially less than proficient.  All they must really record, in practice, is sufficient information to justify a finding of a disapproval.  Further, as long as in the opinion of the check pilot the airman eventually received training in and/or satisfactorily demonstrated proficiency in noted deficient areas, that tested airman may then subsequently &#8220;pass&#8221;.  Especially since he had test events in which it was determined that the entire flight check must be redone, we don&#8217;t know all of the specifics.  I was, therefore, merely stating that we don&#8217;t absolutely KNOW (as I feel you stated when you said &#8220;About the only thing he NEVER FAILED &#8211; your caps &#8211; was stall recovery) that this particular pilot had not had any problems with stalls.  We can only KNOW if an area was found to be unsatisfactory if it has been specifically identified as such, not if it has NOT been documented.   </p>
<p>I never said, nor meant, that he had previouslly performed poorly at stall recoveries, nor did I even provide a reason as to why he seems to have done so in this accident.  In fact, I asked/stated &#8220;Was he simply “surprised” and/or “panicked”, responding in a manner contrary to everything he had been taught? We’ll probably never know for sure, but it certainly seems so.&#8221;</p>
<p>While I can understand how you might (possibly correctly) view some of the comments in some of the posts here as &#8220;just crusaders’ efforts at ‘not wasting a crisis’&#8221; to further their own personal agenda, what in the world to you think might have been my ulterior motives or &#8220;agenda&#8221;?  </p>
<p>I believe I have done nothing more than to restate factual information, along with some personal experience and belief, in a logical, rational, and deductive manner to support my view of what I think the NTSB may ultimately find were the probable causes of this accident.  I don&#8217;t believe I promoted anything but thought, and I attacked nothing and no one.  I assure you I have and had no agenda at all, either open or hidden, other than to attempt to bring information to light for consideration by any interested people who read Bruce&#8217;s article and our posts here.  I do this in the hope that we might all be encouraged to remind ourselves, and others, that we must always be vigilant in our duties, and proficient in our performance, when we fly.  The consequences of not doing so are simply too great, and all of us lose at least a little when any of us fail to remember that.</p>
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		<title>By: Kevin Collins</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=192&#038;cpage=1#comment-21997</link>
		<dc:creator>Kevin Collins</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2009 23:47:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=192#comment-21997</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Travis Christensen said in reference to recreating the situation in a simulator, &quot;[i]t took roughly 2500 feet to recover once we had relaxed the back pressure on the control column&quot;. Since you said the airplane would have recovered on its own, I wonder if &quot;2500 feet&quot; was a typo since the accident airplane was at ~1600&#039; AGL when the problem started. Would you please clarify?

Thanks, and I also appreciate all of the great info everyone has contributed to this thread.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Travis Christensen said in reference to recreating the situation in a simulator, &#8220;[i]t took roughly 2500 feet to recover once we had relaxed the back pressure on the control column&#8221;. Since you said the airplane would have recovered on its own, I wonder if &#8220;2500 feet&#8221; was a typo since the accident airplane was at ~1600&#8242; AGL when the problem started. Would you please clarify?</p>
<p>Thanks, and I also appreciate all of the great info everyone has contributed to this thread.</p>
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		<title>By: Harold Coghlan</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=192&#038;cpage=1#comment-21993</link>
		<dc:creator>Harold Coghlan</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2009 22:24:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=192#comment-21993</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I have been a pilot and instructor for more than 30 years in military/airline/charter/corporate flight environments, and although we hate that regional pilot pay scales are not what they should be, it appears quite clear that this case is not about pay, nor duty rigs, nor fatigue, nor even weather for that matter (contributing factor maybe, but not causal).

Rather, as several have explained so well in the prior commentaries, this case appears (in very simplified terms) to be all about a) Lack of Situational Awareness (SA), b) Not following standard procedures (like putting the gear down early, putting props high/fwd early, not veryfying that the airplane was configured correctly, etc, etc), c) Improper speed control,  and lastly, d) Lack of 
proper stall recovery technique.

All airplanes stall because the wing&#039;s angle of attack (AOA)  exceeds the stall AOA, and the only way to recover is to reduce the AOA (notice I did not say to &quot;level off&quot;) and increase the power. This basic technique works regardless of whether the plane is a Boeing or a Cessna, whether the plane has manual/hydraulic or fly-by-wire flight controls, or whether the plane has or not a stick pusher.

I feel sorry for the current state of airline pay vs. job demands, but as others have said, neither pay nor lack of rest was causal to this accident, Pilot Error was. sad, but true.

Unfortunately, every time an aircraft accident happens, all of us in aviation are affected, and all of us feel the pain.

Stay safe, and remember &quot;speed is your friend&quot;.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I have been a pilot and instructor for more than 30 years in military/airline/charter/corporate flight environments, and although we hate that regional pilot pay scales are not what they should be, it appears quite clear that this case is not about pay, nor duty rigs, nor fatigue, nor even weather for that matter (contributing factor maybe, but not causal).</p>
<p>Rather, as several have explained so well in the prior commentaries, this case appears (in very simplified terms) to be all about a) Lack of Situational Awareness (SA), b) Not following standard procedures (like putting the gear down early, putting props high/fwd early, not veryfying that the airplane was configured correctly, etc, etc), c) Improper speed control,  and lastly, d) Lack of<br />
proper stall recovery technique.</p>
<p>All airplanes stall because the wing&#8217;s angle of attack (AOA)  exceeds the stall AOA, and the only way to recover is to reduce the AOA (notice I did not say to &#8220;level off&#8221;) and increase the power. This basic technique works regardless of whether the plane is a Boeing or a Cessna, whether the plane has manual/hydraulic or fly-by-wire flight controls, or whether the plane has or not a stick pusher.</p>
<p>I feel sorry for the current state of airline pay vs. job demands, but as others have said, neither pay nor lack of rest was causal to this accident, Pilot Error was. sad, but true.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, every time an aircraft accident happens, all of us in aviation are affected, and all of us feel the pain.</p>
<p>Stay safe, and remember &#8220;speed is your friend&#8221;.</p>
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		<title>By: Dave Tuuri</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=192&#038;cpage=1#comment-21978</link>
		<dc:creator>Dave Tuuri</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2009 03:26:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=192#comment-21978</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Mike Finkle Said: 

June 8th, 2009 at 12:57 pm 
&quot;Actually, Mr. Tuuri, we don’t know that his performance was satisfactory regarding stall recoveries. I only listed specific problem areas for the one specific proficiency training event...&quot;

Well, I read all the docket&#039;s documents and interviews with check airmen giving the rides. As a former DPE myself, I noted no reference to stalls anywhere in any test the PIC ever failed. I think you are using this accident to further your own agenda--and you have lots of company, unfortunately. Fatigue, sterile cockpit, training, pay, flight hours, etc., have no bearing on the root cause of this crash which was, simply, the stick did not go forward when the shaker went off. Pure and simple. But why didn&#039;t it? The other items are just crusaders&#039; efforts at &#039;not wasting a crisis&#039;.

Dave Tuuri]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Mike Finkle Said: </p>
<p>June 8th, 2009 at 12:57 pm<br />
&#8220;Actually, Mr. Tuuri, we don’t know that his performance was satisfactory regarding stall recoveries. I only listed specific problem areas for the one specific proficiency training event&#8230;&#8221;</p>
<p>Well, I read all the docket&#8217;s documents and interviews with check airmen giving the rides. As a former DPE myself, I noted no reference to stalls anywhere in any test the PIC ever failed. I think you are using this accident to further your own agenda&#8211;and you have lots of company, unfortunately. Fatigue, sterile cockpit, training, pay, flight hours, etc., have no bearing on the root cause of this crash which was, simply, the stick did not go forward when the shaker went off. Pure and simple. But why didn&#8217;t it? The other items are just crusaders&#8217; efforts at &#8216;not wasting a crisis&#8217;.</p>
<p>Dave Tuuri</p>
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