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	<title>Comments on: Cirrus Chute &#8211; Come back with your shield or on it?</title>
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	<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=166</link>
	<description>A place to discuss safety-of-flight issues, procedures, techniques, and judgment.</description>
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		<title>By: Derek Schwalenberg</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=166&#038;cpage=1#comment-28860</link>
		<dc:creator>Derek Schwalenberg</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 17 Feb 2010 18:47:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=166#comment-28860</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I am a fairly new CFI and a senior at UVU. My undergraduate research project is on the CAPS system. (Mainly on how to train pilots on how to use it properly)I haven&#039;t written it yet, but its not due till April. So far the conclusions I have come to are...
     - It has saved lives and it is probably better to have it than not.
     - Still many pilots have pulled it at the wrong time
     - You cannot be too fast
     - You cannot be too low
     - You must not be on fire
     - It must be done at the first sign of a spin
     - It will total the aircraft
Also after some digging, it seems that the parachute is the only way to recover from a spin according to test pilots... So although Cirrus will claim that it is purely an innovative safety device [which it is in most respects] it was not necessarily something they could have gone without either. The only solution I can seem to find to the most lively debate I have heard in recent years around the field is know when its ok to pull the red lever. Its not going to be an easy project. It involves some serious ADM at an obviously critical time. There are also many hazardous attitudes to deal with on both ends of the spectrum. Complacent pilots who will chute at any slight sign of distress and macho pilots who will not pull the red total-me lever until its too late to do so. I find myself wondering about how I would make myself pull the switch at 5,000ft within&#039; the first rotation of a spin... (because after the first 900ft or so it will just rip-off) I know it is a hazardous attitude and I have identified it, but it is still there none-the-less.
     Long story short I think the only way forward is to develop a training program on &quot;To deploy or not to deploy&quot; [part of my thesis statement] Although on the Cirrus it may have been implemented at least in part [to be fair] because its the only demonstrated spin recovery procedure, it seems that it has saved at least some lives and therefore will become more and more popular. In fact I believe you can now order BRSystems for other small singles as well. My point is we should focus the debate on how to train to use these properly rather then whether or not they should be there because in the long run there may be more and more aircraft with that option.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I am a fairly new CFI and a senior at UVU. My undergraduate research project is on the CAPS system. (Mainly on how to train pilots on how to use it properly)I haven&#8217;t written it yet, but its not due till April. So far the conclusions I have come to are&#8230;<br />
     &#8211; It has saved lives and it is probably better to have it than not.<br />
     &#8211; Still many pilots have pulled it at the wrong time<br />
     &#8211; You cannot be too fast<br />
     &#8211; You cannot be too low<br />
     &#8211; You must not be on fire<br />
     &#8211; It must be done at the first sign of a spin<br />
     &#8211; It will total the aircraft<br />
Also after some digging, it seems that the parachute is the only way to recover from a spin according to test pilots&#8230; So although Cirrus will claim that it is purely an innovative safety device [which it is in most respects] it was not necessarily something they could have gone without either. The only solution I can seem to find to the most lively debate I have heard in recent years around the field is know when its ok to pull the red lever. Its not going to be an easy project. It involves some serious ADM at an obviously critical time. There are also many hazardous attitudes to deal with on both ends of the spectrum. Complacent pilots who will chute at any slight sign of distress and macho pilots who will not pull the red total-me lever until its too late to do so. I find myself wondering about how I would make myself pull the switch at 5,000ft within&#8217; the first rotation of a spin&#8230; (because after the first 900ft or so it will just rip-off) I know it is a hazardous attitude and I have identified it, but it is still there none-the-less.<br />
     Long story short I think the only way forward is to develop a training program on &#8220;To deploy or not to deploy&#8221; [part of my thesis statement] Although on the Cirrus it may have been implemented at least in part [to be fair] because its the only demonstrated spin recovery procedure, it seems that it has saved at least some lives and therefore will become more and more popular. In fact I believe you can now order BRSystems for other small singles as well. My point is we should focus the debate on how to train to use these properly rather then whether or not they should be there because in the long run there may be more and more aircraft with that option.</p>
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		<title>By: William Dobson, CFII</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=166&#038;cpage=1#comment-25069</link>
		<dc:creator>William Dobson, CFII</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 06 Sep 2009 02:57:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=166#comment-25069</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[As a slightly seasoned CFII (2600hrs TT, 1000hrs dual instruction given)  and first and only owner of a 1st generation Cirrus SR20 (2002 year model - vacuum-driven 6-pack panel - 1350hrs TT),  I have seen, heard, and debated ad nauseum the entire spectrum of opinions on this subject.

The bottom line is that this debate is never going to be resolved one way or the other.  Too many &quot;old school&quot; pilots and instructors who are unwilling to embrace the advantages of new technology, methods, and practices on the one hand, too many blindly optimistic pilots and instructors who uncritically embrace and tout the enhanced safety aspects of the newest and largely unproven aviation widjets on the other hand.

However, _I_ want the &#039;chute.  I would love it if the flight school I work with would have all their Cessnas retrofitted with them.  In my almost 9 years of flying my Cirrus, I have been in three situations where I was mere seconds from needing the parachute.  Had I not had the luxury of time to think of an alternate plan in each case, I would have pulled the &#039;chute and been happy.  Had I been in one of our trainer planes, having the time to think would have been the ONLY option for a safe outcome.  

The first case: Left aileron pulley separated from the autopilot servo shaft while on approach in low IMC. After a few seconds of thinking I had lost all roll command control and actually starting the deployment sequence, I realized I could still control the plane although the controls were extremely sloppy, so I declared an emergency but was able to land safely.

The second case:  Unforecast icing during an IMC approach descent.  The airframe accumulated 3/4 of an inch of rime ice in less than 2 minutes (Aeronewsnet used after-landing pictures of my plane for their article on icing last year)  The airplane stalled at approx 100 KIAS with no buffet and no other advance warning.  My up-to-then-strictly-theoretical training on how to deal with tail plane stalls and my own instructors&#039; warnings to land with no flaps and the power in in such situations kept me from deploying the chute.

The third and most recent case:  Day VFR ;4500ft  MSL; BANG, the engine starts losing oil pressure.  Make precautionary landing.  Find crankcase cracked fore-to-aft along the upper right cylinder deck, almost 18 inches long  (from just aft the prop  shaft seal to past the data plate).  Had I not made the precautionary landing, the engine likely would have failed catastrophically in flight. As I&#039;m waiting the several weeks for a new engine to be installed, I discuss with my IFR students what they would do if that scenario occurred in IMC and thus an immediate return to the airport was not an option.  The only &quot;win&quot; scenario we could come up with was a &#039;chute pull.

The &quot;old schoolers&quot; argue that I obviously have the &quot;right stuff&quot; because I used my &quot;superior knowledge and skills&quot; to avoid needing the &#039;chute in all three cases.  The &quot;new tech&quot; pilots argue that I was an idiot in all three cases for waiting to pull the &#039;chute because I had no way of knowing at the time that the situation was salvageable.  Both groups are wrong.  In each case I  just decided to try something else FIRST, BEFORE pulling the parachute, and that decision turned out to be an O.K. one.  MY opinion is that I&#039;m glad the &#039;chute was there as a &quot;plan B&quot; -- in each case I flew the plane all the way to a safe landing with my left hand but my right hand was firmly wrapped around the big red handle just in case my decision to fly instead of pull  turned out to be the wrong choice.

The parachutes will continue to save lives, but only if the pilots decide to use them.  Some pilots will use the presence of the parachute to justify a risky decision to fly or continue a flight.  Some pilots flying planes with parachutes won&#039;t use it even if the situation plainly calls for it for fear of being called a wimp by the hangar rats.   Some pilots will pull the &#039;chute even though another acceptable resolution to an in-light hazard exists.  Unless it is you in the seat staring at the instruments, the ground going &#039;round and &#039;round,  and the big red parachute handle (or lack thereof) , DO NOT second-guess the pilot&#039;s decisions, lest we talk bad about you later too!

Regardless of your opinion, airplanes are THINGS - easily replaced.  pilots, crews, and pax are PEOPLE - not replaceable at all.  I opt for replacing the plane and so I am glad I and others have a parachute available.  I only wish that more of the planes I fly on a daily basis had them.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As a slightly seasoned CFII (2600hrs TT, 1000hrs dual instruction given)  and first and only owner of a 1st generation Cirrus SR20 (2002 year model &#8211; vacuum-driven 6-pack panel &#8211; 1350hrs TT),  I have seen, heard, and debated ad nauseum the entire spectrum of opinions on this subject.</p>
<p>The bottom line is that this debate is never going to be resolved one way or the other.  Too many &#8220;old school&#8221; pilots and instructors who are unwilling to embrace the advantages of new technology, methods, and practices on the one hand, too many blindly optimistic pilots and instructors who uncritically embrace and tout the enhanced safety aspects of the newest and largely unproven aviation widjets on the other hand.</p>
<p>However, _I_ want the &#8216;chute.  I would love it if the flight school I work with would have all their Cessnas retrofitted with them.  In my almost 9 years of flying my Cirrus, I have been in three situations where I was mere seconds from needing the parachute.  Had I not had the luxury of time to think of an alternate plan in each case, I would have pulled the &#8216;chute and been happy.  Had I been in one of our trainer planes, having the time to think would have been the ONLY option for a safe outcome.  </p>
<p>The first case: Left aileron pulley separated from the autopilot servo shaft while on approach in low IMC. After a few seconds of thinking I had lost all roll command control and actually starting the deployment sequence, I realized I could still control the plane although the controls were extremely sloppy, so I declared an emergency but was able to land safely.</p>
<p>The second case:  Unforecast icing during an IMC approach descent.  The airframe accumulated 3/4 of an inch of rime ice in less than 2 minutes (Aeronewsnet used after-landing pictures of my plane for their article on icing last year)  The airplane stalled at approx 100 KIAS with no buffet and no other advance warning.  My up-to-then-strictly-theoretical training on how to deal with tail plane stalls and my own instructors&#8217; warnings to land with no flaps and the power in in such situations kept me from deploying the chute.</p>
<p>The third and most recent case:  Day VFR ;4500ft  MSL; BANG, the engine starts losing oil pressure.  Make precautionary landing.  Find crankcase cracked fore-to-aft along the upper right cylinder deck, almost 18 inches long  (from just aft the prop  shaft seal to past the data plate).  Had I not made the precautionary landing, the engine likely would have failed catastrophically in flight. As I&#8217;m waiting the several weeks for a new engine to be installed, I discuss with my IFR students what they would do if that scenario occurred in IMC and thus an immediate return to the airport was not an option.  The only &#8220;win&#8221; scenario we could come up with was a &#8216;chute pull.</p>
<p>The &#8220;old schoolers&#8221; argue that I obviously have the &#8220;right stuff&#8221; because I used my &#8220;superior knowledge and skills&#8221; to avoid needing the &#8216;chute in all three cases.  The &#8220;new tech&#8221; pilots argue that I was an idiot in all three cases for waiting to pull the &#8216;chute because I had no way of knowing at the time that the situation was salvageable.  Both groups are wrong.  In each case I  just decided to try something else FIRST, BEFORE pulling the parachute, and that decision turned out to be an O.K. one.  MY opinion is that I&#8217;m glad the &#8216;chute was there as a &#8220;plan B&#8221; &#8212; in each case I flew the plane all the way to a safe landing with my left hand but my right hand was firmly wrapped around the big red handle just in case my decision to fly instead of pull  turned out to be the wrong choice.</p>
<p>The parachutes will continue to save lives, but only if the pilots decide to use them.  Some pilots will use the presence of the parachute to justify a risky decision to fly or continue a flight.  Some pilots flying planes with parachutes won&#8217;t use it even if the situation plainly calls for it for fear of being called a wimp by the hangar rats.   Some pilots will pull the &#8216;chute even though another acceptable resolution to an in-light hazard exists.  Unless it is you in the seat staring at the instruments, the ground going &#8217;round and &#8217;round,  and the big red parachute handle (or lack thereof) , DO NOT second-guess the pilot&#8217;s decisions, lest we talk bad about you later too!</p>
<p>Regardless of your opinion, airplanes are THINGS &#8211; easily replaced.  pilots, crews, and pax are PEOPLE &#8211; not replaceable at all.  I opt for replacing the plane and so I am glad I and others have a parachute available.  I only wish that more of the planes I fly on a daily basis had them.</p>
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		<title>By: Jerry Zemell</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=166&#038;cpage=1#comment-24041</link>
		<dc:creator>Jerry Zemell</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 02 Aug 2009 16:52:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=166#comment-24041</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Opinions opinions opinions, without them, we&#039;d all be the same. The fact, the gentleman survived this ordeal is a tribute to his decision(s).  Let that be the lesson from which other issues, not to be discussed here, but in the correct forum, may be derived.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Opinions opinions opinions, without them, we&#8217;d all be the same. The fact, the gentleman survived this ordeal is a tribute to his decision(s).  Let that be the lesson from which other issues, not to be discussed here, but in the correct forum, may be derived.</p>
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		<title>By: Stephen Wilson</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=166&#038;cpage=1#comment-15489</link>
		<dc:creator>Stephen Wilson</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 17 Apr 2009 23:12:48 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=166#comment-15489</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&lt;a href=&quot;http://stevewilsonblog.com/2009/04/16/dead-pilots-dont-lie.aspx&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;Dead pilots dont lie&lt;/a&gt;.&#160; NTSB reports show Cirrus planes advertised with a safety parachute&#160;are three times more deadly than their aluminum rival without.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://stevewilsonblog.com/2009/04/16/dead-pilots-dont-lie.aspx" rel="nofollow">Dead pilots dont lie</a>.&nbsp; NTSB reports show Cirrus planes advertised with a safety parachute&nbsp;are three times more deadly than their aluminum rival without.</p>
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		<title>By: rdth</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=166&#038;cpage=1#comment-15307</link>
		<dc:creator>rdth</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 Apr 2009 17:53:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=166#comment-15307</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In my 40 year&#039;s of flying, I&#039;ve known many people with pilot&#039;s licenses who really shouldn&#039;t have been flying. They were never comfortable with it, and their performance was marginal. For some reason they frequently attempted something beyond their capabilities. In the old days, it resulted in one of two possible outcomes: 1) scaring themselves out of flying forever or 2) dying in a crash. Fortunately it more of the former than the latter. Now, there is a 3rd option for these types: the chute. &quot;I&#039;m really not comfortable with this flight, but I&#039;ve always got the chute&quot;. How prevalent is this attitude? I have no idea, but I&#039;m sure it exists to some degree. Don&#039;t get me wrong, I love the Cirrus and think the chute is a great idea but a drawback is that it encourages some people to fly who really shouldn&#039;t be.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In my 40 year&#8217;s of flying, I&#8217;ve known many people with pilot&#8217;s licenses who really shouldn&#8217;t have been flying. They were never comfortable with it, and their performance was marginal. For some reason they frequently attempted something beyond their capabilities. In the old days, it resulted in one of two possible outcomes: 1) scaring themselves out of flying forever or 2) dying in a crash. Fortunately it more of the former than the latter. Now, there is a 3rd option for these types: the chute. &#8220;I&#8217;m really not comfortable with this flight, but I&#8217;ve always got the chute&#8221;. How prevalent is this attitude? I have no idea, but I&#8217;m sure it exists to some degree. Don&#8217;t get me wrong, I love the Cirrus and think the chute is a great idea but a drawback is that it encourages some people to fly who really shouldn&#8217;t be.</p>
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		<title>By: John W Ross, PE</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=166&#038;cpage=1#comment-15072</link>
		<dc:creator>John W Ross, PE</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Apr 2009 15:47:52 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=166#comment-15072</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Ref: parachutes for airplanes and open doors.
      I was flying a Cherokee when a door popped open on take-off. I was flying VFR and alone. I couldn&#039;t even get the door opened 2 inches in order to slam it latched. It is a great reminder of the fact that you are going very fast by most people&#039;s guess. 
      I did get it closed but If I were IFR I would definitely initiate a  &quot;go back and land&quot;  procedure. Just like any other problem in flight the pilot has to deal with it his way. 
     As far as parachutes are concerned, they should be only for test pilots, maybe. What are we coming to? if we keep this up we will make flying so safe that it won&#039;t be any fun anymore. Of course, how this comment is taken depends on whether your are a pilot or a passenger. I once gave a friend a ride and he was extremely calm.  Given who he was, I would have expected him to be a little nervous, at least. When I inquired about his calm attitude he said simply, &quot;I know you value your life more than you do mine. Signed JWR]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ref: parachutes for airplanes and open doors.<br />
      I was flying a Cherokee when a door popped open on take-off. I was flying VFR and alone. I couldn&#8217;t even get the door opened 2 inches in order to slam it latched. It is a great reminder of the fact that you are going very fast by most people&#8217;s guess.<br />
      I did get it closed but If I were IFR I would definitely initiate a  &#8220;go back and land&#8221;  procedure. Just like any other problem in flight the pilot has to deal with it his way.<br />
     As far as parachutes are concerned, they should be only for test pilots, maybe. What are we coming to? if we keep this up we will make flying so safe that it won&#8217;t be any fun anymore. Of course, how this comment is taken depends on whether your are a pilot or a passenger. I once gave a friend a ride and he was extremely calm.  Given who he was, I would have expected him to be a little nervous, at least. When I inquired about his calm attitude he said simply, &#8220;I know you value your life more than you do mine. Signed JWR</p>
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		<title>By: Rich Nasser</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=166&#038;cpage=1#comment-15005</link>
		<dc:creator>Rich Nasser</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2009 17:25:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=166#comment-15005</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[So more information has come thru regarding the Cirrus incident.  I thank the pilot for being so candid in his thought process - and opening himself to critical and judgemental comments.

It reminds me of an accident in 2003/2004 while training in the PanAm flight school in Phoenix:  A student in an Archer on a solo flight (not sure if he was PP or working on another rating or certificate) had the yoke come off the stick.  He panicked but then thought he could safely land the plane using rudder, elevator trim and power.  Remarkably, he landed the plane without injury but one wing was destroyed.  Not once, during his ordeal did he think about climbing into the right side and using that yoke which was in perfect condition! 

He recalled having one misison, and that was to get the plane on the ground (which he did).  Everyone, after the fact, laughed and ridiculed him and Monday-morning-quarterbacked him but none of those folks were in his shoes - so it was not fair.

Different pilots will react differently to the same situation - some would have climbed in the right seat, some would have done what this young man did, and some would have died.  

While you can&#039;t mimic real-time crisis scenarios during training, the scenario-based training is still the best route and instructors and examiners must have a keen eye to seeing how someone might react certain scenarios.

I am sure the Cirrus pilot is not happy with what happened to his plane and is having second thoughts, but he is alive to tell about it- and ask any of his family and friends and I&#039;m sure they&#039;ll prefer that over the alternative tragic outcome.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>So more information has come thru regarding the Cirrus incident.  I thank the pilot for being so candid in his thought process &#8211; and opening himself to critical and judgemental comments.</p>
<p>It reminds me of an accident in 2003/2004 while training in the PanAm flight school in Phoenix:  A student in an Archer on a solo flight (not sure if he was PP or working on another rating or certificate) had the yoke come off the stick.  He panicked but then thought he could safely land the plane using rudder, elevator trim and power.  Remarkably, he landed the plane without injury but one wing was destroyed.  Not once, during his ordeal did he think about climbing into the right side and using that yoke which was in perfect condition! </p>
<p>He recalled having one misison, and that was to get the plane on the ground (which he did).  Everyone, after the fact, laughed and ridiculed him and Monday-morning-quarterbacked him but none of those folks were in his shoes &#8211; so it was not fair.</p>
<p>Different pilots will react differently to the same situation &#8211; some would have climbed in the right seat, some would have done what this young man did, and some would have died.  </p>
<p>While you can&#8217;t mimic real-time crisis scenarios during training, the scenario-based training is still the best route and instructors and examiners must have a keen eye to seeing how someone might react certain scenarios.</p>
<p>I am sure the Cirrus pilot is not happy with what happened to his plane and is having second thoughts, but he is alive to tell about it- and ask any of his family and friends and I&#8217;m sure they&#8217;ll prefer that over the alternative tragic outcome.</p>
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		<title>By: Alex Kovnat</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=166&#038;cpage=1#comment-14960</link>
		<dc:creator>Alex Kovnat</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2009 13:58:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=166#comment-14960</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I would like to add my perspective on the matter of ballistic recovery parachutes.

If an airplane or helicopter is to have a &#039;chute, it should be because the pilot/owner who has to pay for said aircraft and live with its limitations, wants to have it on his or her own plane.

IMHO, aircraft should NOT be required to have parachutes because some neurotic intellectual (i.e. Ralph Nader), who most likely doesn&#039;t like general aviation anyway, wants other people&#039;s planes to have said device. 

We have seen how the cars we drive are being burdened with more and more safety gadgets primarily to gratify the emotional and intellectual needs of the Ralph Naders of the world, for more and more safety devices on other people&#039;s cars. 

I would like to point out that if the FAA were to mandate parachutes regardless of whether a specific owner/pilot likes it or not, then what next? As a reader of Flying magazine for years, I recall reading in their accident column (On the Record) about a young girl who was fatally struck down by the whirling propeller on her father&#039;s plane. Should we then require all prop-driven planes to have wire cages (like on a fan one might use in one&#039;s home or office to keep cool in hot weather) around their propellers, regardless of the aerodynamic penalty, to gratify the emotional and ego needs of intellectuals for such things on other people&#039;s planes?

Some owner/pilots may want parachutes on their planes, some not. So the verdict should be: BRS systems? Yes -- If a specific owner/pilot wants one!]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I would like to add my perspective on the matter of ballistic recovery parachutes.</p>
<p>If an airplane or helicopter is to have a &#8216;chute, it should be because the pilot/owner who has to pay for said aircraft and live with its limitations, wants to have it on his or her own plane.</p>
<p>IMHO, aircraft should NOT be required to have parachutes because some neurotic intellectual (i.e. Ralph Nader), who most likely doesn&#8217;t like general aviation anyway, wants other people&#8217;s planes to have said device. </p>
<p>We have seen how the cars we drive are being burdened with more and more safety gadgets primarily to gratify the emotional and intellectual needs of the Ralph Naders of the world, for more and more safety devices on other people&#8217;s cars. </p>
<p>I would like to point out that if the FAA were to mandate parachutes regardless of whether a specific owner/pilot likes it or not, then what next? As a reader of Flying magazine for years, I recall reading in their accident column (On the Record) about a young girl who was fatally struck down by the whirling propeller on her father&#8217;s plane. Should we then require all prop-driven planes to have wire cages (like on a fan one might use in one&#8217;s home or office to keep cool in hot weather) around their propellers, regardless of the aerodynamic penalty, to gratify the emotional and ego needs of intellectuals for such things on other people&#8217;s planes?</p>
<p>Some owner/pilots may want parachutes on their planes, some not. So the verdict should be: BRS systems? Yes &#8212; If a specific owner/pilot wants one!</p>
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		<title>By: Andrew Brown</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=166&#038;cpage=1#comment-14950</link>
		<dc:creator>Andrew Brown</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2009 06:22:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=166#comment-14950</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[There is a frequent but bogus argument used against various safety features known as &quot;the promotion of a false sense of security&quot;. Examine the words closely and notice that &quot;sense&quot; of security is 100% entirely a mental issue. It is also therefore 100% a training issue. People position themselves as close to the edge as they want, *regardless* of where the edge is located. Pulling the edge in may pull them in as well, but they will be no further from the edge than they were before. But it *will* reduce the maximum distance the cautious ones have available to place between themselves and the edge.

Removing safety features is a rediculous approach to teaching responsibility and thinly veiled machismo. The same argument would justify removing seatbelts and airbags from cars so drivers would drive wiser, removing life vests from boats so sailors would sail safer, removing railings from observation decks so people wouldn&#039;t get so close to the edge, removing safety keys from table saws so carpenters are more careful with the power switch, or better yet, raising wing stall speeds so pilots better learn to fear stalls.

If there are limitations on the safe application of a particular safety device, then pilot training should indoctrinate the particulars and I welcome that discussion. But disparaging the device altogether is throwing the baby out with the bathwater and serves no one in GA other than those wanting to boast of their skill in surviving a dangerous avocation. The latter should feel free to prove themselves by flying fast unstable aircraft in fog with minimal instrumentation ... without me.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There is a frequent but bogus argument used against various safety features known as &#8220;the promotion of a false sense of security&#8221;. Examine the words closely and notice that &#8220;sense&#8221; of security is 100% entirely a mental issue. It is also therefore 100% a training issue. People position themselves as close to the edge as they want, *regardless* of where the edge is located. Pulling the edge in may pull them in as well, but they will be no further from the edge than they were before. But it *will* reduce the maximum distance the cautious ones have available to place between themselves and the edge.</p>
<p>Removing safety features is a rediculous approach to teaching responsibility and thinly veiled machismo. The same argument would justify removing seatbelts and airbags from cars so drivers would drive wiser, removing life vests from boats so sailors would sail safer, removing railings from observation decks so people wouldn&#8217;t get so close to the edge, removing safety keys from table saws so carpenters are more careful with the power switch, or better yet, raising wing stall speeds so pilots better learn to fear stalls.</p>
<p>If there are limitations on the safe application of a particular safety device, then pilot training should indoctrinate the particulars and I welcome that discussion. But disparaging the device altogether is throwing the baby out with the bathwater and serves no one in GA other than those wanting to boast of their skill in surviving a dangerous avocation. The latter should feel free to prove themselves by flying fast unstable aircraft in fog with minimal instrumentation &#8230; without me.</p>
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		<title>By: James Sinnott</title>
		<link>http://blog.aopa.org/leadingedge/?p=166&#038;cpage=1#comment-14943</link>
		<dc:creator>James Sinnott</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2009 02:43:20 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.aopa.org/asfblog/?p=166#comment-14943</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[To all the nay sayers you weren&#039;t there.  I say he did all right some one once told me &quot;any landing you can walk away from is a good one&quot; he did both. Kudos]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>To all the nay sayers you weren&#8217;t there.  I say he did all right some one once told me &#8220;any landing you can walk away from is a good one&#8221; he did both. Kudos</p>
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