Since you do seem to have just a “hint” of arrogance which is not knowledge based, let’s go over this one more time, shall we?

As to it being so “simple,” all I will say is…part 91 vs part 121… You’re right – it IS that simple!

For some reason, you cannot comprehend that these two flights did not magically revert to a part 91 operation and rules after they took off. You still need a clearance while on an IFR flight plan, the tower is still responsible for you as long as you are IFR and the separation has to be maintained. The controller monitoring you on radar does that. That is their primary area of responsibility. Neither crew cancelled IFR…they needed a landing clearance under the FAR’s.

The emergency items do NOT apply because they did not declare an emergency…

I suggest you go back and re-read what you actually typed and understand what you typed. 91.185 talks about two way operations and loss of communication WITHIN THE AIRCRAFT NOT the tower. This is also for an aircraft operating under part 91 NOT 121. In the DCA case, both sets of pilots were able to talk with anyone…they were NOT NORDO! The tower has light signals for ensuring you can land if landing VFR. If IFR, can go to a specific fix or a landing limit if the flight crew loses the radios NOT the tower. If DCA is your clearance limit you still do NOT have permission to land! Try to think of it this way….if I receive an IFR clearance to fly from JFK to FRA, does that clear me to land? No way….it allows me to leave JFK with a domestic US routing clearance, fly it, then get an oceanic clearance, followed by a European domestic clearance after completing the ocean part, then an arrival routing clearance into Frankfurt. After that I will get a specific runway clearance and approach clearance. Using your logic, you would say I am cleared to land in Frankfurt. In reality, if losing radios in that scenario, I will never, ever get close.

Over!

91.185 provides the procedures for IFR aircraft experiencing lost comms.

It’s that simple. Over.

http://www.aopa.org/asf/seminars/safetycasts/farRefresher.html

In conclusion, that’s all great Bob…except they were NOT dispatched under part 91 rules…part 121 is comepletely different in so many respects… Using Sully’s flight is a bit of a stretch….when down to 35% power in one engine only you are an emergency situation…intuitively.

Not sure you understand that these two flights were under a whole different set of rules as you keep referring to part 91 rules…there IS a difference and do not apply to these crews, Bob.

Having had to divert numerous times over 35 years at the end of my duty day, most forward thinking pilots ARE thinking about the next “failure” of sorts -that could be maintenance, weather, airport ops, etc. If it never happens then you land, go to the hotel and get some rest. Sometimes it does not play out that way and you must use the skills you have hopefully been trained to use at certain times.

Is it without risk? Sure! Only if you never leave the gate is there zero risk as nobody moves and nobody gets hurt. We all assume some level of risk in everything we do

BTW, “requiring crew performance to compensate for gross incompetence to fulfill a fiduciary duty…” Huh? Just what do you define as a “fiduciary duty?” If it’s part of their flight that is NOT fiduciary at all but very, very basic.

Additionally, it is also clear, Bob, that you have never taken part in a part 121 annual requal or you would already know that diverting can and usually IS part of the yearly scenario in the sims. The crews are trained to do just that in their LOFT scenarios. Again, this is part 121 NOT part 91 – totally different… When they had to go around or hold up their approach, they are automatically looking at diverting for their fuel state, unknown airport state , maintenance (in other cases) or for a variety of last minute issues which impede their ability to land – diverting is NOT going to surprise them and the adrenaline rush is going to kick in.

You also might want to actually do some reading up on Class B, E and G airspace as Mr Feith intimates. It’s very clear they could not land without a clearance if you go back and do some research, Bob.

91.131 defines Class B airspace in the context of VFR. For example, an IFR flight will never be issued a discrete class B clearance, which is what this regulation addresses. What is the floor of the class B airspace with 7DME of the DCA VOR? I see no issues there.

Furthermore, I do not agree that a diversion for a sleepy controller is a non-issue for a flight crew ending their duty day. I would agree that a flight crew has to be ready for anything, but requiring crew performance to compensate for gross incompetence to fulfill a fiduciary duty, with no appreciable or tangible impact on flight safety? IMHO, that goes too far.

Also IMHO, FAR 91.3 PIC authority requires the acceptance of the decision of the pilot in light of the extenuating circumstances.

In conclusion, the pilots exercised their authorities under FAR 91.3 to fulfill their duties and ensure the “safety of the flight.” Nothing succeeds like success, and while we can split this hair ever after, the results at the end of the day speak for themselves.

The 770 concept was covered much earlier in the disucssion…

If you are dovetailing onto that earlier question/assertion that alarmbells would have gone off in the tower, I think you might be confusing alram bells with what controllers get when a transponder goes to 7700 on his/her screen or for an intruder alert when planes get too close. Not at all certain it would have woken the slumbering ATC Supervisor for one thing and if the intent was only to wake the person up, there are probably better avenues to take to do so.

As to your comment about having “file reams of paperwork to, and deal with, endless B.S. from the FAA.” unless filing an air safety report the reams of paper for declaring an emergency is completed by the Company – not the pilots. Your declaration about it “would have resulted” is wrong – that does not not in part 121 ops. Crews do fill out some mandatory reports, but declaring an emergency report for the FAA is generally not one of them. They would most probably complete a report under an ASAP program or a NASA ASRS and never even talk to the FAA….

As I mentioned earlier, the prudent course of action if, in fact, attempting to find out what was going on in the DCA tower that night would have been for the TRACON to call the Metro police and have them send up some of their folks to ensure the tower was in proper hands…or a sleepy controller supervisor.

The approach plate for DCA (http://avn.faa.gov/pdfs/ne_19_10MAR2011.pdf) identfies the airspace at DCA as Class B. Unlike some other airports that have their respective airspace classifications changed when the control tower closes (i.e. reverting from class D to class G, etc.), DCA is Class B continuously thus the following applies:

91.131 Operations in Class B airspace.

(a) Operating rules. No person may operate an aircraft within a Class B airspace area except in compliance with §91.129 and the following rules:

(1) The operator must receive an ATC clearance from the ATC facility having jurisdiction for that area before operating an aircraft in that area. [The jurisdiction would have been DCA Tower and not Potomac TRACON]

(2) Unless otherwise authorized by ATC, each person operating a large turbine engine-powered airplane to or from a primary airport for which a Class B airspace area is designated must operate at or above the designated floors of the Class B airspace area while within the lateral limits of that area….

Neither the AAL or UAL flightcrews declared an emergency, thus “AIM 6-1-2: Emergency Condition – Request Assistance Immediately” is not applicable, and the TRACON controller can not declare the emergency on behalf of the flight crew. In addition the TRACON controller can’t change the classification of the airspace on the fly and suggest a pilot treat a continuously controlled airport as an uncontrolled field.

To those pilots that believe that diverting to an alternate airport would have increased the risk – what is the basis for that statement?? The two aircraft involved were not Cessna 172s flying VFR, low level at night – both aircraft were being operated on an IFR flight plan and under the control of the TRACON. Thus had they chose to divert, the pilots would have been given a clearance (that would have extended their flight plan) and they would have received all of the ATC protections (communications and radar monitoring) that operating an airplane on an IFR flight plan affords a pilot. Additionally, there would not have been added risk as suggested by one respondant (“executing a go-around, re-configuring the aircraft, setting up the cockpit and briefing another approach; busy, busy, busy. More opportunities to make a mistake and more time spent in the air where something bad can happen”) because all pilots, including these two professional flightcrews, are trained to perform these tasks without compromising the safe operation of the airplane. Also, the crews would not have had to perform these tasks had they diverted prior to commencing the approach. Therefore the “risk” would have been negligible compared to the risk of landing at an airport where the surface environment (people, vehicles, airplanes, etc) was unknown.

Maybe AOPA and ASF need to collaborate on an article that reviews the airspace classifications and what a pilot can and can’t do in specific airspace under unusual circumstances such as the DCA event. In addition, John Yodice should provide the legal ramifications that a pilot could experience if they conducted themselves as the AAL and UAL crews did. We can all use an airspace refresher and this might be a good education opportunity.

A diversion at that time of night probably is not going to be causing too much turmoil for a divert crew in terms of getting a direct routing and taking the shortest path. However, there is one more point which everyone seems to have overlooked or might simply not be known.

Some apples are clearly being mixed in with the oranges….

The DCA airspace is classified as “Class B” airspace with a lot of restricted airspace and a prohibited area too. Obviously that is lot different from landing at Hayden or any other potentially uncontrolled airfield. Under the rules for an airport which is located underneath that Class B airspace, you cannot just go ahead an “put er down uncontrolled”…it requires the crew to have a valid landing clearance to do so. To the best of my knowledge, that did not happen with either crew – they should have gone around and TRACON should have not led the pilots into thinking everything was copacetic…itmight not have been thus.

I do believe that might just qualify as a bona fide safety issue for all concerned…. Had either crew declared an emergency – which neither did – they can do pretty much as they did….but you cannot have it both ways!

“An aircraft is in at least an urgency condition the moment the pilot becomes doubtful about position, fuel endurance, weather, or ***any other condition that could adversely affect flight safety.*** ” — AIM 6-1-2: Emergency Condition – Request Assistance Immediately

“EMERGENCY- A distress or an urgency condition.”

I’m pretty sure the pilots had some doubts about a condition (unknown though it was) that could adversely affect flight safety. The dissenters all argue that this was the case.

IMHO, Jim K has it right. While diversions are not a big deal, a diversion under these circumstances would have introduced more risk – and placed more of it on the crew. At no time was there a safety issue in continuing to the IFR clearance limit. Airliners land at untowered airports – some with very inhospitable environments (HDN, AOO and SHD all come to mind).

It’s unfortunate that the lessons of COM5191 and Teterboro are still unlearned – as the FAA notes in the FOI… learning occurs when behavior changes….

If you want a good story, mark your calendar for about 54 weeks after the incident. Then call the FAA and ask how many controllers are working the tower at 0015 local? We both already know the answer….

Finally, this is yet another clear example that our national priorities remain irrationally aligned. We have thousands standing around looking for undergarment bombers, and one lone guy risking his life (i.e., medical emergency as noted) alone in the cab tower to save the FAA a couple grand a year. It’s silly math in the extreme. We can only be thankful that the controller wasn’t making arrangements with his girlfriend for a cookout featuring grilled cat as the main dish – tower freq audio inadvertently muted.