AOPA ASF Blog: Safety eJournal

Some people complain that the FAA Practical Test Standards (PTS) are not sufficient for today’s flying complexities. I’m not so sure about that and here’s why. The basics of not crashing airplanes haven’t changed in decades but the legalities have. In our frequently over-thought, bureaucratic and legalized interpretation of just about everything, common sense often gets bounced because someone was clever enough to create a loophole and someone else wasn’t smart enough to call them on it. Thus things get rewritten and “strengthened.”

The current PTS on every certificate largely dwells upon physical flying skills: Takeoffs, landings, ability to hold headings, altitudes, adhere to clearances, flying by reference to instruments, etc. The guidance is pretty clear. Let’s take a few examples from the Private PTS:

Takeoffs: Follow proper procedure for the takeoff roll, liftoff at the recommended airspeed and maintain Vy +10/-5 knots. etc.

Landings: Establish proper configuration, maintain a stabilized approach +10/-5 knots, touch down at or within 400 feet of a specified point with no drift etc.

If everyone adhered to these basics we’d have almost no takeoff and landing accidents, which account for about 50% annually.

How about the “incredible” complexities of assessing today’s navigation? The PTS handles this elegantly - Demonstrate the ability to use an electronic navigation system, locate the aircraft position, intercept and track, recognize station or waypoint passage, recognize signal loss, etc.

What more could you want? It’s fairly simple for an examiner to determine if the pilot knows the box even if the examiner isn’t quite certain of the nuances of a particular system. Most know where the stations and fixes are located in their area and they know when the applicant is floundering. If in doubt, perhaps the examiner’s own hand-held unit could be used to keep at least one front seat occupant oriented. I’m sure there will be some different views on that and would welcome them.

Here’s what’s tough on tests. To the extent that it’s possible, a superficial assessment is made of judgment or decision making. In the artificial world of checkrides, everyone is going to play it conservative and we don’t really get to see how someone will react until they think no one is watching. Bad judgment is where serious accidents happen - usually an entanglement with weather or stupidity involving low level maneuvering. We might consider offering continuing guidance by CFIs to help their newly certificated private or instrument pilots make the right call in the real world. Call it “service after the sale.”

If anyone knows of a pilot applicant who passed a checkride after a crash, where there wasn’t a mechanical problem, and the applicant was manipulating the controls, a prize is in the offing. Suitable proof and not just hearsay must be presented (That was a loophole slamming shut and there’s probably one I’ve missed)

If everyone adhered to the basic skill level in the various PTS, we’d have many fewer accidents. Do we need stiffer requirements? I don’t think so. In almost every case the accident pilots weren’t flying to the standards we already have. Are you up to the standard? Could you pass a checkride on your next flight? Might be fun to try.

What do you think?

As we approach the Independence Day holiday, remember that one of our most cherished freedoms is flight. In most countries GA has effectively been legislated out of their airspace under the mantras of safety and security. Of course we know that the airspace belongs to the people - not the airlines and not the government.

You’ll see on several other blogs and on the AOPA home page that will be posted this week or next, there is the encouragement to fly and to take a non-pilot companion along. In most cases it will be a dynamite experience. You’ll have had a great time sharing our passion with someone and quite possibly infected them with the flying bug. In a few cases, the experience will be bad due to pilot immaturity or skill deficiency.

Here are a few examples from the ASF Safety Database.

In the first accident, SEA02FA005, a student pilot took a passenger out on a “pleasure flight” that ended with an attempt to land in a forest clearing in low IMC. The passenger, at least, lived to tell the tale.

In this second example, LAX99FA162 is an instructive low-altitude maneuvering accident that killed two people and destroyed a Globe Swift. The pilot obliged a “female camper” who wanted a ride by making repeated low passes over a campground on a dry lake bed after sunset.

Our third example, CHI03FA149, involves a low-time private pilot trying to pick up a friend at a 2,000-foot grass strip, undeterred by the ten years that had passed since his last soft-field landing practice. The fact that he’d never actually landed on grass didn’t figure into his flight planning, either.

Finally, MIA08CA145 proves that complacency is always a risk, even for a 7,000-hour ATP. Good intentions won’t prevent inattention.

Here’s the point - it doesn’t need to be that way. Go fly on the fourth and take a friend. Be smart and safe. Enjoy what is a truly unique American freedom.

When should engines be overhauled? Some believe that the engine manufacturer’s recommendation are loose guidelines and that your mileage may vary greatly. Others adhere to them as gospel and treat them as mandatory. Times typically run between 1,500 and 2,500 hours and there’s usually a calendar factor of about 12 years so the guidance is for whatever comes first. Piston aircraft engines are extremely reliable when properly maintained, when flown regularly and correctly. You can see some important qualifiers creeping into the discussion. Some of the most outspoken advocates on both sides of the argument are extremely knowledgeable which means we best look deeper.

Several charity medical transport groups are beginning to require volunteer pilots to certify that their engines are below the manufacturer’s Time Between Overhaul (TBO) recommendations. There’s been some predictably negative reaction but the groups may have a point and here’s why. Under the FARs, flights for hire must have engines below TBO and while the charity flights are certainly not in that category, the groups are concerned that they kind of look like it to the FAA and NTSB. The groups are acting as a facilitator or broker between pilot and a trusting passengers, who likely know nothing about aviation safety. It’s quite a different relationship than when we just take a friend flying. Despite liability disclaimers and efforts to put a firewall between the group and the pilot, there’s a perception and an expectation of a higher level of care.

Reliable statistics are a great starting point for any safety discussion and in turbine aircraft, which are renowned for reliability, the manufacturer’s overhaul guidance is typically followed to the letter but there’s great emphasis on tracking. With piston engine aircraft, there just isn’t much to go on. For example, in the 2008 Nall Report there were 87 accidents attributed to powerplant malfunctions. What’s confounding is that we often don’t get the total time on the engine and prop.

We also don’t know how many parts and pieces are caught on the verge of failure and at what point in their life span. I know from personal experience that brand new engines are some of the quirkiest. It’s also true that organizations have no desire to be publicly called out, no matter how remote the risk, if there’s an appearance that they didn’t take every reasonable precaution to prevent a mishap.

We’d like to hear your thoughts pro and con.

If you’ve been keeping up with the legal trials of Cirrus Aircraft, you’ll know that they just had a major verdict go against them by a Minnesota jury regarding a fatal accident in an SR22. The crash occurred in January 2003 and according to the NTSB, the probable cause was “Spatial disorientation experienced by the pilot, due to a lack of visual references, and a failure to maintain altitude. Contributing factors were the pilot’s improper decision to attempt flight into marginal VFR conditions, his inadvertent flight into instrument meteorological conditions, the low lighting condition (night) and the trees.” Trees are always a problem for aircraft.

Witnesses saw the Cirrus at altitudes as low as 100 feet AGL flying very fast and in controlled flight on a predawn flight to get to a hockey game. You can read the details at ASF’s Accident Database - Search NTSB number CHI03FA057, tail number N9523P.

The 248-hour VFR pilot had about 57 hours of instrument instruction and had attended the factory school conducted by the University of North Dakota (UND). One of the training sessions discussed to VFR into IMC procedures. Despite not being rated and obviously marginal weather, the desire to see hockey apparently was overpowering that morning.

Cirrus and UND were cited as negligent by the jury for not adequately training the pilot to fly in IFR conditions. The plaintiff’s attorney claimed that Cirrus and UND did not provide risk management training in-type and that lead directly to the crash. The pilot was held to be 25% responsible. The award was for about $14 million dollars - Cirrus is considering an appeal.

Consistency in the legal system seems to missing, in my view. Does anyone know of another participant activity where the manufacturer is so seldom at fault, yet attorneys seem to have good success at persuading juries that the pilot was largely innocent? A comparable activity, at least for fatality purposes would be motorcycles. A neophyte can go to rider’s school, get a certificate from the state that is a license to learn, and be warned not to take the bike into high speed situations. When the new rider is late to a hockey game, for example, and wipes out going 100 mph, do Harley or Kawasaki get nailed? Probably a rhetorical question - perhaps, more importantly, how can we light the candle of enlightenment under the pilot’s backside to not get into these situations? Alternate solutions are tort reform or only allowing hockey games to take place in good VFR conditions.

If you’ve been following the NTSB’s deliberations regarding Continental 3407, the Q-400 (Dash 8 derivative) that crashed in Buffalo this winter in what appears to have been a crew mishandling accident, you’ll know that this is going to be a landmark case. I’ve blogged on it twice; Time in Type and Travel? Buffalo Q-400, and Tail Stall?, but will use the mishap as a stepping off point to a broader topic.

The U.S. Congress has called for a comprehensive review of all commercial airline pilot training and certification programs. On the face of it, that might seem like a reasonable response but I have a hunch that the rules are probably adequate. The problem more often lies is in the adminstration of the regulations. The flash points here are an apparent disregard for airspeed, apparent unfamiliarity with stick pushers, a botched stall recovery, a lack of experience in icing conditions, and disregard of the sterile cockpit rule. There’s probably more but this is enough to chew on.

Rather than the regulations themselves, it might be more telling to explore how FAA is providing guidance to its inspector force, how the inspectors are interpreting that guidance, how new pilots are hired by the carriers, how training is actually being administered to new pilots by the airline and how sterile cockpit is enforced.

It’s clear that the intent, and I suspect the letter, of the regs are that pilots be competent in managing their aircraft in the conditions they are likely to encounter. The airline is on shaky ground in my view, when they say they weren’t required to teach the pilots about the stick pusher. Pilots need to know these things! How the aircraft got so slow that the pusher activated is perhaps another discussion entirely.

That the captain’s record wasn’t exactly the best, will be thoroughly reviewed in the report and it’s inappropriate for me to prejudge here but, again, airlines should know that if someone has a bad rap sheet, it’s a bad idea to entrust them with a multimillion dollar aircraft and 50 passengers. There will be more on this, I’m sure.

Lastly, it’s really unfortunate to give up more privacy to have FAA and airline management routinely scrutinizing cockpit voice recorders but if this is shown to be a critical distraction then maybe that’s less unfortunate than having innocents losing their lives. I’m betting that 90 plus percent of crews are diligent on sterile cockpit but the “bad apple” metaphor balls it up for the rest.

For those of us flying light GA aircraft, there’s lot to learn from this accident in general terms. If you make every attempt to be proficient with your aircraft, understand the nature of the weather in which you’re flying and stay focused on the task at hand, the outcome is likely to be much better.

My take is that there are enough regs, so let’s just use them regularly and efficiently with maybe a dab of common sense as well.

This note came from a reader who flies a Piper Arrow

“Last night I was approaching XXX from the east, sequenced behind a PC-12 approaching from the south, both operating under IFR clearances. He canceled airborne; I heard him call “an extended left base for 34″. This seemed a bit odd, since 34 is published as right traffic. I waited until I saw him on short final, apparently in good position to land, before cancelling IFR and announcing my intention to enter a right base for 34.

The next thing I knew, he was calling his crosswind turn, again in left traffic, for 34. I asked at that point if 34 wasn’t right traffic, but got no answer.

So — what was I supposed to do now? Flying a right base toward converging traffic obviously wasn’t going to work. Circling until he got down again wouldn’t help if he was doing pattern work, perhaps for night currency. I asked if he was “closed traffic,” and he affirmed. Flying left traffic on what I knew to be a published right pattern didn’t appeal to me much, either.

I’d be interested to hear what your readers would have done.”

So, Readers:

1. Advise the PC12 Pilot in stronger terms (politely)

2. Go someplace else to practice

3. Take his tail number and report him to the FAA

4. Set Phasers to ‘Stun’ and blast him

Hate to put more verbiage on ASOS or AWOS on traffic patterns but that might be one solution.

I think this helps to make our case that right traffic patterns should be identified on IAP charts. There are some government types who are not yet persuaded but we’re working on that.

The preliminary report on a Baron A55 that crashed after making three low passes over a work party in Minden, Nevada on May 9th confirmed it was a buzz. On the last pass the aircraft was observed at 100-300 feet agl when the pilot pulled abruptly into a steep nose up attitude and rolled left. You know what happened next.

What makes this so much worse is that four passengers were killed while the PIC attempted to display his prowess. This is remarkably similar to another Baron accident that happened a few years back where the pilot attempted some aerobatics with a plane full and with the same deadly results.

This quote from that article is a short survey that pilots should offer their passengers before engaging in such aerial stupidity.

“Try this on your passengers the next time you take to the sky: “OK, gang, I’m about to try a maneuver that I haven’t practiced and have had no training in. The aircraft is prohibited from this type of maneuver, and it’s never been tested by the manufacturer.” (Depending on the type of maneuver, you can add, “We’re going to fly really close to the ground and well below legal limits.”) Then say, “There’s also a good chance that we could all die if I mess this up, but if I pull it off it will be way cool! So, are you in?” Wanna bet what the reaction would be?”

The audience that reads this blog, takes online courses, and goes to seminars isn’t the problem so do us all a favor - please forward these links to all the young (most of them don’t make it to middle age) impressionable aces of the base. The smart ones will start to get it and the others will, as the attached Pilot Safety Announcement says, ” Keep General Aviation firmly in the public eye.”

Real Aviation Heroes	School Daze

If anyone has any PRACTICAL suggestions on how to constructively address this - we’d sure like to hear it.

The NTSB held its public hearing this week on Continental flight 3407 that crashed in Buffalo this winter. There has been much speculation about icing, tail stalls, autopilot weirdness, crew coordination, crew qualification, training - pretty much everything has been open for discussion.

The revelations this week noted that the captain had consistently failed flight checks, that the company (Colgan Air) failed to provide adequate training since the captain had not been trained in stall recovery using the stick pusher that is part of the Dash 8’s stall safety system. The pusher apparently activated as the crew allowed airspeed to decay. Colgan responded that the crew had been properly trained. There was speculation that the crew may have been fatigued at the end of a long day. The first officer (FO) had flown in from Seattle the day before after a skiing vacation and had said she wasn’t feeling well.

The FO also was heard on the cockpit voice recorder voicing concern about icing. The captain responded that it wasn’t a problem and he had experience with ice - but it wasn’t in the Q-400.

I’ll offer two observations: A significant portion of this may come down to experience in type. The captain had just over 100 hours in the Q-400. This is something that the Air Safety Foundation sees constantly regardless of the size of aircraft. There is a noticeable drop off in accident involvement after the first 200 hours in make and model. This happens for two reasons - In GA, not that many pilots accumulate high time in any one model so the exposure may be less and the pilot has started to learn how he/she and the machine interact.

There is more mental margin when one knows the aircraft well. You know its limits and strengths and generally have learned to compensate accordingly. That leaves more time for managing other distractions, such as icing. As an aside, being on guard to adverse developments and mentally running contingency plans is the mark of a pro. Amateurs dismiss such things as unimportant or an over-reaction.

Secondly, it seems logical that the first officer might be fatigued since she had acclimated to a different time zone. In the hearing it was brought out that she lived on the west coast and routinely commuted cross country. The captain was reported to have lived in Florida but both crew members flew out of Newark, NJ.

Two thoughts that will likely generate contrarian views and they are cheerfully accepted:

1. Airlines should leave pilots in make and model routinely so that when an FO upgrades to captain he/she already knows the aircraft well - it’s just a seat and mindset change. Some carriers do this and pay is based strictly on seniority, not the size of the hardware. It’s smart from a human factors and cost perspective. There should be some flexibility to allow equipment change but it really shouldn’t be the norm.

2. The time and distance allowed for commuting pilots should be limited. Long duty days become much longer when it’s a 3 -10 hour commute home and you’re subject to all the “variability” of airline schedules. This is one of the sacred cows of airline jobs that gets into pay/lifestyle issues but it collides directly with fatigue and readiness for flight.

These same factors apply to GA flight ops. We need to know the equipment and be ready to fly. Your thoughts?

I’m wondering if other pilots are having any challenges with ATC still living in the VHF airways world when most of us have moved into GPS point-to-point Nav. I was IFR in a busy terminal area navigating to a flight plan waypoint when ATC requested an intercept to Victor XXX and to proceed on course.

The Garmin 480 is arguably one of the most capable and most complex units of the last generation FMSs and required several button pushes to get it thinking the same way the controller was. It also required me to open a neatly folded chart to get the bearing of the airway to effect said programming. While I was wallpapering the cockpit with chart, the controller very politely and efficiently suggested a heading of 030 to get on with it.

That got me to thinking about three ways to handle this:

1. Carry the charts, prefolded at the ready, as we used to do
2. Switch the MFD over to IFR map mode and intercept the appropriate airway, then go back and reconfigure the GPS.
3. Ask ATC to start using RNAV language for GPS equipped aircraft (which is most of us these days). We can navigate direct to any waypoint on the planet, so why not just send us to ZZZZZ? That will require some procedural changes but seems like it might be time to adapt to the not-so-new world.

The temporary fix is to ask for a vector while getting things sorted out and maybe that’s the best short term solution As the next generation of avionics starts to make things much easier much of this will become moot. Just wondered how the rest of you were fairing in this transition.

Let’s discuss circuit breakers (CB). We routinely verify during the prestart check that they are pushed in or appropriately disabled. Most of the time this is perfunctory and it’s a boring topic - sorry. Read on.

In the recent landmark accident CBs and wiring were implicated. Note that the rules regarding CBs have changed - In years past, if a CB popped the practice was to let it cool and reset ONCE on the theory that it might be a transient fault. No more. If a CB pops, unless it’s flight critical, do NOT reset. There have been only a few instances of big in-flight electrical fires where the aircraft and lives were lost. In this case, the tab was about $20 million and the lawsuits are flying. Seems like a lot for a simple thermal-mechanical device.

If you smell burning insulation before disabling the appropriate CB, the aircraft should be grounded until the fault has been isolated and the affected wiring replaced. That’s probably going to be expensive. But, if that seems harsh, according to NTSB engineers, once the wiring is hot enough to melt insulation so you can smell it - the insulation is toast, if you’ll pardon the pun. It will no longer function as intended and there is a fair chance that other circuits or equipment may malfunction and cause a fire when you least need it. Don’t forget that on-board fire extinguisher - this is potentially an extremely serious fault. Remember where it is? Can you reach it? Is it properly charged? Again - boring but critical.

Wiring is like props - we take them for granted and they routinely perform with little complaint until something unfortunate happens suddenly. Also suggested reading is ASF’s new In-Flight Electrical Fires Safety Brief on the topic. It’s a short read.

If you have a wiring story, please share it. Many others may benefit.