AOPA ASF Blog: Safety eJournal

A friend and ASF donor took me to lunch in his brand new Eclipse yesterday. As you’ll read in the August issue of AOPA Pilot, Editor-in-chief Tom Haines also earned his EA-500S type rating. I have three observations after the ride.

1. The FAA and Eclipse do not give away the ratings - it is a thorough and rigorous process involving simulation, lots of ground training and mentoring on actual trips until the experienced mentor jet pilot in the right seat thinks you’re ready. My friend is multi-thousand hour Baron pilot and has a Citation type rating but no real jet time. He is a meticulous and cautious engineer - a perfect mind set for this and he agreed with Haines that his plate was full.

2. Higher Power Aviation, who does the training for Eclipse, follows a well-defined process to prepare customers for the check ride. In flying fast airplanes the profile is everything. Plug in power settings, and configuration and shazzam, the aircraft falls into predictable performance on the descent, on the ILS, in holding etc. However, to make the speed differential less daunting and to get people through the type ride, the training profile bears little resemblance to what real world ATC needs.

As it is currently being taught, fly the approach at Vref plus 10 knots from the final approach fix inbound. Try that any busy airport with appreciable jet traffic and you’ll hear words you never heard in the bible as controllers and the pilots behind you try to resolve the ensuing traffic tie-up. In the real world, it’s often 150-170 knots to the marker. To be fair, this how the airlines teach their new hires and then when everyone gets on the line, the realities take over. The mentor pilot for my friend gently explained how things were and proceeded with his reprogramming. Seems to me, even if it takes a little longer, we should teach real world profiles right from the beginning. One set of numbers to remember and more practice in getting right.

3. Despite the marketing claims to the contrary, at least with early versions of the VLJ, it looks much like jet flying to me in terms of single pilot workload. Not too bad in low density airspace or at altitude and really intense on short legs or in high density. It’s good they don’t give the type ratings away.

The Lancair experimental aircraft: beautiful, fast and having what the FAA calls a “disproportionate” number of fatal accidents. There have been 7 fatals since February including the most recent, which occurred this week. Here are some preliminary FAA statistics running from October of last year:

Lancairs make up just over 3% of the amateur built ( AB) fleet yet have over 10% of the fatal AB accidents. Keep in mind, however, that they also tend to fly significantly more than the typical AB local flights. These are cross country machines.

Over half the Lancair accidents in this small sample were fatal while the rest of the AB fleet is just slightly above the overall GA fleet fatal accident ratio of 1 fatal mishap for every 5 accidents. Here’s what’s interesting - unlike the typical high performance aircraft that have fatal weather encounters, the Lancairs are generally in VFR conditions and involve loss of control - i.e a stall/spin.

A couple of observations: High performance aircraft may be squirrelly in stalls but not always. The certificated Columbia ( now Cessna) 350/400, which has ties to the Lancair early in its history, has a good stall/spin safety record. “Experimental” means that aircraft handling is left up to the designer and the extent of flight testing is entirely at the designer’s discretion. It may be very thorough or not. Factory built aircraft must meet specific construction and performance standards and are FAA tested for compliance. That’s one of the reasons for the cost differential.

There may also be variability in the building process. The designer suggests that it be built this way and the builder thinks he has a better idea or just isn’t adept at putting the machine together.

A few aerodynamic realities: Small wings and big engines make for very fast aircraft with high wing loadings and glide ratios not much better than the proverbial brick. If the engine stops for whatever reason, the crash dynamics are often not very good.

I believe that pilots should be able to build and fly their own aircraft. Extra training is one way to compensate, although not always successfully, with “hot” aircraft. There’s lots of history on that. Comparative statistics on any aircraft model’s safety are complex until you’ve accumulated enough accidents to say there’s a problem - the hindsight approach - and the denominator (exposure) factor is always squishy. Government crash testing, as done on automobiles, just doesn’t seem feasible for aircraft.

Your thoughts?

With apologies to Lyricist George Gershwin and singer Billie Holiday, the livin’ ain’t so easy as density altitude climbs. In the last few days we’ve had a couple of accidents that sure look like density altitude, although it’s too soon to say for sure.

Whenever I see high temperatures and high terrain I’m suspicious. When a high performance aircraft that is typically a strong performer at lower density altitudes is fully loaded, I’m almost ready to put money on it.

The two fatal accidents that appear to fit the DA profile both happened on June 29: In Santa Rosa, NM a Cessna 206 with 5 passengers was lost shortly after takeoff. One state over, at the 7,000 foot of a mountain close to North Las Vegas, NV, a Cherokee 6 also with five passengers crashed. We’ll learn more as the investigation goes forward but if this is the case, to lose 10 people in one day because the pilots forgot that sea level performance doesn’t exist in the summertime is sad, expensive, and really unacceptable.

My experience with hot and high makes me conservative on who and how much to carry. Trip legs are frequently shorter as fuel load is lightened and I really study the route carefully so as to be at altitude before getting to the high terrain, if that’s possible.

Some years ago when taking a mountain flying course, while pausing at Leadville, CO to get the certificate for being at the highest airport in the U.S. , I watched a fully loaded Cessna 172 almost do the deed. The airport picture makes it look deceptively easy. The Skyhawk is not exactly a ball of fire with all seats full at sea level. With a runway of 6,400 feet, that’s less than the field elevation of 9,927 feet msl the Cessna pilot clearly did not understand what he was up against. With four people on board the Cessna rolled and rolled and rolled. It sagged off the ground, caught its breath in ground effect and then sagged some more into the the cool thin morning air. That coolness was the only thing that saved them because by early afternoon there would have been no climb at all - only forward and down.

If you haven’t done much high terrain flying recently take a look at ASF’s mountain flying course.

As we did in talking about near fuel accidents, share your experiences that you or a “friend” had in learning about density altitude beyond the academic view. Is there a way we could be teaching this more convincingly?

More than a decade ago there were five GPS manufacturers making IFR-approved units. ASF asked for a group meeting, along with FAA, to discuss some level of input standardization. No two units worked the same way so we suggested that core IFR-essential functions be somewhat standardized.

The core functions were Direct To or selecting a bearing from a fix , setting up an approach, missed approach procedure, and holding. Everything else would be left to the manufacturer to innovate. A pilot, once trained on core functions, could fly any box in the IFR system without extensive retraining although they might not be able to use all the clever or advanced features that were built in to every system.

Obviously, we didn’t prevail in what I still think was a common sense human factors approach. Innovation was the goddess of the day and there is certainly merit to that argument. However, there is much to favor in commonality where flight critical operations are concerned. Many pilots do not have a monogamous relationship with an aircraft. Renters, CFIs, club pilots, pilot examiners and other assorted vagabonds who fly multiple aircraft got saddled with a complex and expensive training barrier.

“Legacy” units that are either orphaned by a defunct builder or one who has left the old boxes behind often have scant or way too much documentation. Personally, I find 200 page manuals daunting - especially for an aircraft that I may only fly every few months. It’s tough to find good computer-based simulation to practice or even a CFI who knows how to run an earlier generation unit, let alone teach it. Most installed avionics have a life span of 15 - 20 years and unless one has a generous allowance for upgrades, we’ll be living with a very mixed fleet for some time.

As it stands today, pilots who wish to fly glass models of classic aircraft will spend many hours and perhaps thousands of dollars to get back into the cockpit of an old friend. Flight management systems are wonderful devices that were originally designed for two pilot flight decks, a strong training infrastructure, and the cost is usually on someone else’s nickel.

As we start to see some maturity in the GPS market and even a few new players coming back in to broaden the field, is it time to ask the same question again or should market forces continue to hold sway?

Click here for my column on the topic.

Would appreciate your comments and experiences.

Tired of hearing about fuel mismanagement accidents? So am I. We’re losing, on average, several aircraft every week as pilots rediscover that adequate fuel and/or proper configuration of the fuel system is not optional.

I won’t bore you with the usual rants about stupidity, forgetfulness, or wishful thinking. So what’s left to discuss? First, BRIEFLY describe a bout you had with the fuel mismanagement virus and how close to the edge you got.

My story: Years ago, returning from the upper peninsula of Michigan to Wichita Kansas in a Cessna Turbo 210, as front seat passenger, I was party to some bad decision making. My PIC boss, flight planned a non stop IFR trip with the required 45 minute reserve - barely. The weather was good VFR but the prevailing southwesterly breeze took its toll on ground speed. The DME told the tale for over an hour as we fell below the minimum required speed to make the reserve numbers work. Several stops were passed up on the way into Cessna Field in Wichita and we landed with an estimated 20 minutes of fuel remaining. The fuel gauges were abundantly clear that this was dumb. Neither one of us hung around for the fuel truck driver to tell us how close we’d come to explaining to Cessna’s chief pilot why we’d forced landed a brand new Centurion next to the little house on the prairie.

Secondly, how should Air Safety Foundation raise the awareness for all pilots on this most basic and yet one of the most prevalent accident or incident causes? The folks who are running out of gas don’t come to ASF seminars or visit our website so to make a dent, we need to go well beyond the “choir.”

Here are some resources that might be helpful but we need distribution beyond the routine channels.

Two fuel Pilot Safety Announcements were developed last fall and we’ve been showing them at seminars - click on the links to see and to forward.

Click here to view our Fuel Awareness safety advisor.

ASF is promoting the “Golden Hour” of reserve. Had that advice been followed in 2006, we’d have 86 more aircraft that would have arrived uneventfully with no injuries or fatalities to pilots and passengers.

Fuel may be expensive but it’s dirt cheap compared to wrecking airplanes. Your thoughts are welcomed.

There was no shortage of thoughtful response and opinion to last week’s blog on how to enter the traffic pattern at non-towered airports when approaching from the opposite side of downwind. My informal analysis of the more than 120 responses showed you were split just about down the middle between the “Crossovers” and the “Crosswinders” with a very slight edge to Crosswinders.

This is almost identical to the response we got years ago when ASF first published the safety advisor on Operations at Non-towered Airports. We consulted both with FAA Flight Standards and with Transport Canada. We looked at accident statistics on midair collisions and found by far, the most dangerous place is on final approach, not the downwind leg.

Both sides were passionate that their way provided the best separation, spacing and view of other traffic.

There were several recurrent themes of the string :

1. Communication is the most important element, as well as LOOKING
2. Some treated the AIM as gospel, others saw it as guidance and NOT regulatory.
3. Pilot judgment is crucial.

Getting to the bottom line, obviously, the idea is not to swap paint. Clearly, based on your response, one size does not fit all, despite personal preferences. A thought - think like ATC - look for ways to avoid conflict, be courteous, orderly and flexible.

Next week, we’ll try to get beyond the traffic pattern. Thanks to all for participating.

Since we’ve had quite a discussion on comm procedures at non-towered airports let me once again, step between the dog and the fire hydrant. What’s your view on entering on the traffic pattern on crosswind leg at pattern altitude, either mid field or at the departure end ( opposite of where the T.O. roll started)?

There’s a lot of history behind this question which we can engage later and there are certainly pros and cons. My understanding is that in Canada, it is mandatory to enter on crosswind. In the U.S. the AIM does not address how one is supposed to get to the proper side of the pattern if approaching from the opposite side of downwind but assume it is to cross above pattern altitude and descend on the far side to enter into the 45.

I’ve seen it work very well both ways depending on conditions and would like a sense of the audience based on your experiences.

Notam: With AOPA Fly In coming next week and International AOPA conference the following week and out of the country, I will likely be off frequency until late June.

Last week we discussed the overcrowding on Common Traffic Advisory Frequencies ( CTAF) especially at non-towered airports. There were some strong opinions on chatter clutter regarding certain ground calls.

Taxi-out, and clear-of-the-runway calls in day VFR conditions are overkill in my view. The FAA implemented these as runway safety took center stage some years back. Presumably solving one problem often creates others - such as frequency congestion. The statistics and the operational realities at most small GA airports do NOT support these AIM recommendations in my view. Paragraph 4-1-9 and Table 4-1-1 in AIM have the recommended radio calls. I was unable to find a recommendation for a taxi-across-the-runway call so someone is being creative.

If conditions are such that pilots can SEE, there is no need for the above calls. On the runway or on approach, you and I should be scanning for conflicts, just like intersections when driving. It is a high-risk, high-alert time but yakking on taxi activities in high density is distracting from the greater need to avoid aircraft actually departing or airborne in the pattern.

There are three common-sense situations when you should speak up when taxiing. During night and IFR conditions where other pilots cannot easily determine if the runway is clear and in day VFR if the airport layout is such that a runway/taxiway intersection is not visible from the departure end.

It’s a beautiful day, the weekend is here, and the world’s aloft. Collisions should be top of mind. Besides looking out the window, the Common Traffic Advisory Frequency (CTAF) is one of the best tools we have to listen and broadcast positions when entering, leaving or staying in the pattern.

Unfortunately, the CTAFs at many nontowered airports are a mess. If just two airports share the frequency that’s workable. But when several occupy the spectrum, especially when one on the party line is a busy, the radio loses much of it’s lifesaving potential.

What worked 20 years ago may not work today. If you’re flying at a radio-saturated location, how about working with the authorities to make the frequencies usable? Pilots, corporate operators, flight schools, instructors, and the insurance community all have a vested interest. Perhaps the CTAF operator, FBO, or municipality whines about needing new ground radios since the old ones cannot be converted or about how the local pilots will be confused because Podunk Municipal has always been on 122.8. These concerns pale in comparison to what a maidair collision will do to the airport’s reputation.

If your CTAF is overcrowded, do something about it! AOPA has guidance on how to this at http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/air_traffic/unicom.html. Be sure to put your concerns in writing/email so that a paper trail is evident. It’s amazing how accountability encourages responsibility in public officials.

It’s been said many times that the most likely place for a midair collision is on final approach. Looks like it happened again last week where two Cessna 172s got together at a non-towered airport in McCall, ID. The weather doesn’t appear to be problematic and unfortunately, there were fatalities. It’s too early for specifics as to who did, or didn’t, follow procedure or whether it was just a simple failure of see and avoid.

Picture this: You’re on short final and focused on the touchdown zone. The late afternoon sun is in your eyes but with sunglasses and the visors down, it’s manageable, or so you think. The other aircraft, also on final, is just ahead, below and to the right. It might have been visible half a mile back but now is blocked by the cowl. The right seat passenger is looking at the end of the runway, just as you are. The radio is quiet or there is chatter from other aircraft in the pattern but not the collision aircraft. Everything is completely normal until….. you get the picture.

Here are some imperfect suggestions. Traffic patterns, and especially final approach, are a high risk collision area. Never mind how much time is spent there (This applies to CFIs especially) you should be on HIGH alert. The better the weather, the more uncomfortable you should be, because there are more aircraft flying. The other time to be very alert is when nobody is around except that one other aircraft unknown to you. Practice a sterile cockpit - only flight-critical discussion. This is not the time to be discussing the size of the houses. Do enlist everyone on board to look for other aircraft.

There are many time-proven procedures to review in ASF’s Safety Advisor on operations at non-towered airports. There’s more to this than meets the eye ( pun intended) .